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U.S. PACIFIC FLEET AND PACIFIC OCEAN AREAS.

JOINT STAFF STUDY: ICEBERG OPERATION.

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**Commander-in-Chief  
Pacific Ocean Areas**

**JOINT STAFF STUDY**

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U.S. Pacific Fleet and Pacific Ocean Areas.

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UNITED STATES PACIFIC FLEET  
AND PACIFIC OCEAN AREAS  
Headquarters of the Commander in Chief

Serial 000170

21 December 1944

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From: Commander in Chief, U.S. Pacific Fleet and  
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Reference: (a) CinCPOA serial 000131 of 25 October 1944.  
Enclosures: (A) Appendix G to Joint Staff Study ICEBERG,  
with Annex 1, Logistics Measures and  
Annex 2, Troop List.  
(B) Appendix H to Joint Staff Study ICEBERG,  
with Annex 1, Major Forces Required.

1. Enclosures (A) and (B) are forwarded herewith  
for insertion in reference (a). Additional annexes to Encl-  
osure (B) will follow. Change Table of Contents to reflect  
addition of these appendices.

2. These enclosures will constitute the bases for  
logistic preparation and procurement of forces.

FORREST SHERMAN  
Deputy Chief of Staff

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Reference: (a) Subject Staff Study, CinCPOA ser. 000131 of 25 October 1944.  
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(B) Paragraph 5 d, of Appendix E to subject study - "Care of Civilians".

1. Reference (a) states that discussion of Military Government and Care of Civilians in subject operation will be issued separately at a later date.

2. Forwarded herewith as Enclosure (A) is a discussion of Military Government to be included as paragraph 2 k in subject staff study. Also forwarded as Enclosure (B) is a discussion of Care of Civilians to be included as paragraph 5 d of subject staff study.

J.H. TOWERS  
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UNITED STATES PACIFIC FLEET  
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Headquarters of the Commander in Chief

Serial 000131

25 October 1944.

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(to be shown only to those who must see it for further study)

ICEBERG

1. The attached study of ICEBERG is the basis for directives for the operation but is not in itself a directive or considered to commit the Commander in Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet and Pacific Ocean Areas to any course of action. It is circulated to Joint Staff and major subordinate commanders to facilitate planning and implementation, both operational and logistic.

2. Changes may be made in the study as the situation develops.

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*O. L. Thorne*  
O. L. THORNE,  
Flag Secretary.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ICEBERGTable of ContentsPage No.

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CONCEPT

I. DIRECTIVE

The Joint Chiefs of Staff have directed the Commander in Chief Pacific Ocean Areas to occupy one or more positions in the NANSEI SHOTO, target date 1 March 1945. *(Underlying supplied)*

II. ASSUMPTIONS

That the seizure of IWO JIMA is completed at a sufficiently early date to permit availability of fire support units and close air support units for the assault in the NANSEI SHOTO.

That results of our operations against the EMPIRE, FORMOSA, the RYUKYUS, and the enemy Fleet during the period preceding the target date for the NANSEI SHOTO assault indicates that we will be able to maintain continuing control of the air in the objective area.

That assault shipping and supporting naval forces are released promptly from LUZON operations.

III. PURPOSES

To establish bases from which to:

- (1) Attack the main islands of JAPAN and their sea approaches with naval and air forces.
- (2) Support further operations in the regions bordering on the EAST CHINA SEA.
- (3) Sever Japanese sea and air communications between the EMPIRE and the mainland of ASIA, FORMOSA, MALAYA, and the NETHERLANDS EAST INDIES.

This is the only copy of this document in the file dated 19 February 1945.

*The target date is 1 April 1945 because of the need for the release of assault shipping and the 100,000 and 100,000 of operations. The assault is to be completed by 1 May 1945.*



To establish secure sea and air communications through the EAST CHINA SEA to the coast of CHINA and the YANGTZE VALLEY.

To maintain unremitting military pressure against JAPAN.

#### IV. TASKS

##### Immediate:

Capture, occupy, defend, and develop OKINAWA Island and establish control of the sea and air in the NANSEI SHOTO area.

##### Eventual:

Extend control of the NANSEI SHOTO by capturing, occupying, defending and developing additional positions.

#### V. CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS

Carrier attacks on JAPAN and the air threat from the MARIANAS together with our seizure of IWO JIMA are expected to force a concentration of Japanese air strength in the heart of the EMPIRE. Our Expeditionary Forces will be subject to strong attacks by Japanese aviation staged through KYUSHU or the CHINA Coast and FORMOSA.

By making powerful air attacks on the EMPIRE and FORMOSA prior to the OKINAWA assault we can inflict heavy losses upon Japanese air forces and reduce the potential threat to our expeditionary forces.

The capture and occupation of the OKINAWA Islands require that our forces establish undisputed control of the

*See Annex B to Appendix I for the <sup>final</sup> descriptive concept of Commander, Central Pacific Staff, under which the strategic conduct of the operation.*

sea and air in the area of operations. Accordingly, the movement into the RYUKYUS will be preceded by air operations as follows:

- (1) Preliminary reconnaissance of the objectives by air forces based on the Asiatic mainland and by those based in the MARIANAS.
- (2) Destructive attacks on the main Japanese islands by carrier aircraft and by very long range bombers operating from CHINA and the MARIANAS.
- (3) Destructive attacks on the Japanese air forces and bases in FORMOSA, AMOY, and the PESCADORES by carrier task forces and by air forces based in LUZON.

Prior to amphibious operations against OKINAWA, strong carrier attacks will be made as necessary against critical objectives in FORMOSA, the main Japanese islands, and in the RYUKYUS in order to destroy enemy forces and installations.

In advance of the operations, the sea communications of the RYUKYUS will be destroyed to the maximum extent practicable by the action of submarines and by surface and air attacks on shipping.

The approach of the attack force will be covered by further intensified attacks on enemy air bases in FORMOSA, KYUSHU and on islands of the NANSEI SHOTO.

The scheme of maneuver will be designed to gain early use of sufficient airdrome capacity in OKINAWA, together

with unloading facilities adequate to support its development, to maintain positive control of the air in the area.

Air bases will be activated rapidly to support the air garrison listed under Forces Required. The air force to be based ashore will total approximately 650 airplanes.

The port of NAHA will be developed to its maximum capacity to accommodate support shipping and to support forces for subsequent operations. NAKAGUSUKU BAY will be developed as an advanced fleet base with port facilities to provide logistic support for major fleet units and occupation forces.

Following is the general sequence of operations in NANSEI SHOTO:

Phase I Capture the southern portion of OKINAWA including small adjacent islands and develop base facilities.

Phase II Seize the remainder of OKINAWA and IESHIMA and develop additional necessary base facilities in favorable localities.

Phase III Exploit our position in the NANSEI SHOTO seizing and developing additional positions with forces locally available.

VI FORCES

a. Ground Forces.

Tenth Army Headquarters and Army troops.

CORPS

III Amphibious Corps

PRINCIPAL TROOPS

1st MarDiv

MOUNTING AREAS

RUSSELLS

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| <u>CORPS</u>    | <u>PRINCIPAL TROOPS</u> | <u>MOUNTING AREAS</u> |
|-----------------|-------------------------|-----------------------|
|                 | 2nd MarDiv              | SAIPAN                |
|                 | 6th MarDiv              | GUADALCANAL           |
| XXIV Army Corps | 7th Infantry Division   | LEYTE                 |
|                 | 96th Infantry Division  | LEYTE                 |
|                 | 77th Infantry Division  | NEW CALEDONIA         |

In area reserve:

27th Infantry Division at ESPIRITU SANTO.

One infantry division to be designated, mounted in the South Pacific.

b. Garrison Air Forces

|  |           |
|--|-----------|
| 4 Groups Marine Fighters               | 288 VMF   |
| 2 Squadrons Marine Night fighters      | 24 VMF(N) |
| 2 Squadrons Marine torpedo bombers     | 36 VMTB   |
| 2 Squadrons Navy heavy patrol bombers  | 24 PB(HL) |
| 1 Squadron Navy photographic           | 6 VD      |
| 1 Squadron photo-reconnaissance (P-38) | 12 F-5    |
| 2 Groups Army medium bombers           | 128 B-25  |
| 2 Groups Army heavy bombers            | 96 B-24   |
| 2 Squadrons Navy Medium seaplanes      | 24 PB(MS) |

See Appendix F for detailed list of Garrison and Service

Units.

c. NAVAL FORCES

(1) Assault

|       |           |
|-------|-----------|
| 8 BB  | 24 DMS    |
| 9 OBB | 36 LCI(G) |
| 11 CV | 12 LCI(M) |
| 7 CVL | 18 LCI(L) |

|                    |                  |
|--------------------|------------------|
| 18 CVE (combatant) | 20 LCT           |
| 1 CB               | 6 ATF            |
| 12 CA              | 2 ATR            |
| 10 CL              | 1 AKN            |
| 4 CL(AA)           | 4 AN             |
| 158 DD             | 48 PC-PCS-SC     |
| 48 DE              | 24 YMS           |
| 8 AGC              | 1500 LVT (cargo) |
| 12 DM              | 300 LVT (tank)   |
| 24 AM              | 800 DUKW         |

|                     | Troop Capy   | Cargo Capy (MT)   |
|---------------------|--------------|-------------------|
| 90 APA (AP-APH-LVS) | 117,000      | 90,000            |
| 36 AKA (AK)         | 5,400        | 108,000           |
| 8 LSD               | 1,600        | 8,000             |
| 150 LST             | 30,000       | 75,000            |
| 60 LSM              | 4,500        | 12,000            |
| 16 APD              | <u>2,200</u> | <u>          </u> |
|                     | 160,700      | 293,000           |

(2) For Area Reserve

To be deployed at mounting points by D-Day and to be additional to naval forces allocated for the initial assault.

1 AGC  
12 PC-PCS-SC  
12 DE

|            | Troop Capy | Cargo Capy (MT) |
|------------|------------|-----------------|
| 30 APA(AP) | 39,000     | 30,000          |
| 12 AKA(AK) | 1,800      | 36,000          |
| 20 LCT     | 4,000      | 10,000          |
| 10 LSM     | 750        | 2,000           |
| Totals     | 45,550     | 78,000          |

(3) GarrisonBase Supported

The following naval craft, to be obtained from assault forces where possible, are expected to be based at OKINAWA and will require logistic support from the base:

|        |         |          |       |
|--------|---------|----------|-------|
| 20 LCT | 200 LCM | 150 LCVP | 24 PT |
| 2 YMT  | 6 YO    |          | 2 YNG |
| 2 YOG  | 4 YHB   | 2 YP     |       |

Fleet Supported.

The following additional naval craft, to be obtained from assault forces where possible, will be required for the support and defense of the base, and will be supported from fleet sources:

|           |           |       |       |       |
|-----------|-----------|-------|-------|-------|
| 18 DD     | 8 ATF     | 1 ARL | 4 AM  | 1 ARB |
| 6 DE      | 10 LST    | 1 AD  | 4 AN  | 1 ARS |
| 18 PC-PCS | 18 LCI(L) | 1 AGP | 1 AVR | 1 AVD |
| SC        |           |       |       |       |
| 6 YMS     | 18 LCI(G) | 1 ARD | 1 AV  | 2 AVP |

d. Summary of Forces (See Appendix F for details)

|        | <u>Combat</u> | <u>Service</u> | <u>Totals</u> |
|--------|---------------|----------------|---------------|
| ARMY   | 95,811        | 47,932         | 143,743       |
| NAVY   | 2,468         | 57,281         | 59,749        |
| MARINE | 73,676        | 10,177         | 83,853        |
|        | 171,955       | 115,390        | 287,345       |

Area Reserve 2 Infantry Divisions in  
SoPac 28,400

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APPENDIX A  
GROUND FORCES

1. ENEMY STRENGTH AND CAPABILITIES.

The estimated strength of the Japanese Forces in the OKINAWA Group, as of 15 October 1944 is 48,600, including:

|  |              |
|--|--------------|
| 1 Army headquarters                                      | 750          |
| 2 First line infantry divisions                          | 35,000       |
| 1 Fortress group (Possibly an independent mixed brigade) | 4,500        |
| Naval personnel  | 2,100        |
| Air Base personnel                                       | 1,500        |
| Shipping engineer personnel                              | 2,500        |
| 1 Tank regiment (30 L, 47 M tanks)                       | 750          |
| Construction personnel                                   | <u>1,500</u> |
| Total  | 48,600       |

An additional first line division (less 1 regt) is estimated to be on MIYAKO JIMA, 150 miles SW of OKINAWA JIMA; the excepted regiment is estimated to be in the DAITO Group, 170 miles east of OKINAWA JIMA. A fourth division is estimated to be in the AMAMI O SHIMA Group, 90 miles northeast of OKINAWA JIMA. Reinforcement of the NANSEI SHOTO was initiated in July 1944, at which time the two divisions arrived at OKINAWA JIMA. By target date these divisions will have had over seven months in which to organize for defense. As a result of the capture of LUZON and IWO JIMA, the Japanese will probably exert maximum effort to complete full defensive preparations in the NANSEI SHOTO.

The civil population of 443,000, three-quarters of whom live in the southern half of OKINAWA JIMA, offers a potential source for homeguard, milita, and guerilla forces who in them-

selves constitute a serious threat of opposition.

From previous experience it is known that the Japanese will resist fanatically any invasion of the NANSEI SHOTO, and will counterattack and reinforce within the limits imposed by our superior air and naval forces.

Information as to enemy defensive installations on OKINAWA JIMA is meager, but there are indications that the southern half of the island (south of a general line from SERAKAKI to CHIMU) will contain the bulk of garrison forces, and have strongly organized defenses at the beaches and in depth. The northern half of the island is mountainous with a high central ridge bordered by terraces. Therefore, it is assumed that, with the exception of MOTOBU Peninsula, the Japanese will defend this area lightly. IE SHIMA is fortified, and is the location of an excellent airfield. The NAHA Harbor area is reported to be defended by coast defense guns installed on the high ground south of NAHA. These guns are capable of opposing amphibious assault within their range on the east as well as on the west coast. The areas guarding the approaches to NAKAGUSUKU WAN and CHIMU WAN, including the small satellite islands off the east coast, are reported to be heavily fortified. Five airfields are situated in the southern half of OKINAWA JIMA, - two in the JIMA-KATENA area, two in the NAHA area, and one on the east coast midway between KATENA and NAHA. These fields are expected to be strongly defended.

Information on landing beaches is sketchy although locations of fifteen are known on the southern half of OKINAWA JIMA; of these, ten are on the west coast, one on the southeast, and four



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on the east. Further reconnaissance will probably reveal other suitable beaches. There is at least one landing beach on each satellite island off the east coast. Fringing reefs are found off all beaches.

According to available information, the most favorable coastline for landing and for advance inland is west of KATENA, north and south of the river mouth.

## 2. ASSAULT FORCES REQUIRED

The strength of the forces required for the seizure and occupation of OKINAWA JIMA is estimated to be an army of two corps of three reinforced divisions each in the assault, with two Army divisions in area reserve.

Units of the XXIV Corps will be mounted in LEYTE and NEW CALEDONIA. Rehearsals will take place in the mounting areas.

Units of the III Amphibious Corps, less one division, will be mounted in the GUADALCANAL - RUSSELLS area and rehearsed in the GUADALCANAL area. The 2nd Marine Division will be mounted in the MARIANAS and will be the third division of this Corps.

Two Army divisions, the 27th at ESPIRITU SANTO, and an additional division to be designated, will constitute the area reserve.

## 3. DEFENSE FORCES REQUIRED

OKINAWA JIMA lies within bomber range of FORMOSA, the CHINA COAST and JAPAN proper and within fighter range of other islands of the NANSEI SHOTO Group. It can be expected that enemy reaction to the occupation of this island and any other islands in the NANSEI SHOTO will be strong in air and surface vessel counterattack with a possible attempt on the part of the Japanese to retake OKINAWA JIMA. It is estimated that two infantry

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divisions taken from the assault force will be required for garrison.

The principle bases requiring antiaircraft protection will be NAHA, BATEN KO, YONABARU, KUBA SAKI, ONO MISAKI, KOGUSUKU, OSUNOHANA, CHIMU, and TSUKEN JIMA. It is contemplated that eight airfields will be activated in the southern half of OKINAWA JIMA and a seaplane base on TSUKEN JIMA. In order to provide the necessary anti-aircraft artillery protection for installations on OKINAWA JIMA five Army AAA gun battalions, five Army AAA automatic weapons battalions, two Army AAA searchlight battalions and four Marine anti-aircraft battalions will be required.

Coast defenses are required for the protection of the Port of NAHA, the naval base of NAKAGUSUKU WAN and the seaplane base of TSUKEN JIMA. Three Army 155-mm gun battalions of seacoast artillery (SM) will be required.

#### 4. SCHEME OF MANEUVER

The scheme of maneuver for operations against the NANSEI SHOTO will comprise three phases, as follows:

##### PHASE I. See Annex 1

The southern half of OKINAWA JIMA (that part south of a general line from SERAKAKI to CHIMU), including the satellite islands off the east coast, has been selected as the objective area for this phase. The scheme of maneuver is designed to isolate the objective area by seizing ISHIKAWI Isthmus in order to prevent enemy reinforcement from the north. Simultaneously the assault forces will seize and occupy a general east-west line from KUBA SAKI in order to prevent enemy reinforcement from the south. After capture and occupation of the northern half of the objective area, the attack is continued to capture

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and occupy the remainder of the objective area.


PHASE II. See Annex 1.

This phase comprises the capture and occupation of the remainder of OKINAWA JIMA and of IE SHIMA. It will be initiated upon completion of PHASE I on W-Day to be announced by the Commanding General Expeditionary Troops. The seizure of these objectives will be accomplished by a shore-to-shore amphibious assault on IE SHIMA, and a combined shore-to-shore amphibious and land assault against the north half of OKINAWA JIMA. Forces locally available will execute the operation. The scheme of maneuver should embrace the early capture of LOTOBU Peninsula, followed by the capture of IE SHIMA, followed by capture of the remainder of OKINAWA JIMA.

PHASE III

This phase will comprise the seizure and occupation of other positions in the NANSEI SHOTO as directed by CinCPOA.

# **ICEBERG** **Appendix I to Annex B** **Scheme of Maneuver**



ICEBERG

APPENDIX B

AIR FORCES

1. CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS.

Preliminary air bombardment of FORMOSA and OKINAWA will be conducted by the Far Eastern Air Force and 20th Air Force from bases in LUZON, CHINA, and the MARIANAS to the extent that execution of their primary mission permits.

Air operations in direct preparation for the assault will consist of a series of carrier based attacks on FORMOSA, the NANSEI SHOTO, and the KYUSHU - WESTERN HONSHU area, in that order, to destroy enemy air effectiveness at the objective and supporting bases. This succession of attacks will culminate in a sustained attack on KYUSHU just prior to the assault on OKINAWA.

Air opposition having been eliminated by carrier strikes, replenishment of enemy air bases will be prevented by shore based attacks on FORMOSA and the southern RYUKYUS by aircraft based in LUZON and CHINA, and by continued action of fast carrier groups on KYUSHU and the northern islands of NANSEI SHOTO.

Escort carriers will maintain control of the air at OKINAWA and provide direct air support for the assault.

Very heavy bombers from the MARIANAS will provide general support by continuing operations against targets in the EMPIRE and by heavy attacks on OKINAWA.

Tasks

The tasks to be performed by the air forces are:

- (1) Search and reconnaissance.
- (2) Destruction of aircraft, aircraft installations and fixed defenses.

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- (3) Covering strikes on the EMPIRE.
- (4) Neutralization of enemy bases from which operations in the objective area may be threatened.
- (5) Destruction of enemy naval forces and shipping.
- (6) Close protection of our surface forces.
- (7) Direct air support of landings and operations ashore.
- (8) Air defense of the captured base until garrison air fields are activated.
- (9) Continued neutralization of by-passed enemy bases.
- (10) Photographic reconnaissance of objective areas.

## 2. OPERATIONS.

### a. Carrier Forces.

#### Fast Carriers (See Annex 1 to Appendix B).

The Fast Carrier Task Force will sortie from ULITHI on D-15 and will conduct sustained strikes on the FORMOSA - MIYAKO areas on D-11 and D-10. After fueling and receiving replacements, strikes will be conducted against the OKINAWA - AMAMI O SHIMA areas on D-7, D-6 and D-5. Then after again fueling and receiving replacements strikes will be conducted against the KYUSHU - WESTERN HONSHU areas on D-3, D-2, D-1 and D Days retiring as necessary for fueling.

Thereafter the Task Groups will rotate in maintaining a covering position and in conducting supporting strikes as necessary for continuing operations.

During the strikes against OKINAWA on D-7, D-6 and D-5, bombardment by the fast battleships will be conducted.

#### Escort Carriers

The escort carriers will escort and provide air cover for the Expeditionary Force during its movement to the

objective and provide direct air support for the assault, occupation and development of the objective as required. Sufficient escort carriers will remain at the objective to provide air defense until garrison airfields are activated.

#### Transport Carriers

Transport carriers will transport to the area of operations, replacement aircraft, parts, pilots and aircrews for the CVs and CVLs and CVEs. Transport carriers will also transport designated garrison aircraft to the objective.

#### b. Shore Based Air Forces.

##### Naval Search Squadrons, POA

Maintain search of ocean areas north and west of the MARIANAS. If development of airfields on IWO JIMA will permit, extend this reconnaissance as far as practicable toward the NANSEI SHOTO and HONSHU when the Fast Carrier Task Force departs from ULITHI on D-15.

Interdict enemy search by offensive patrols from the MARIANAS and IWO JIMA ahead of the Fast Carrier Task Force.

##### Strategic Air Force, POA

Neutralize enemy bases in the CAROLINES and BONINS. Strike targets of opportunity.

Strike the AMAMI GUNTO and JAPAN as practicable.

Provide fighter escort for VLR attacks on the EMPIRE.

##### China Based Air Forces.

The 14th Air Force and 20th Bomber Command operations will be coordinated by the Commanding General, CHINA-BURMA-INDIA in conformity with Alternate PAC-AID. Specific operations desired by POA are:

Conduct repeated photographic reconnaissance of OKINAWA.

Beginning D-30 sorties allocated to the support

✓ ~~\_\_\_\_\_~~  
of POA will be directed against air installations on Northern FORMOSA.

20th Air Force (MARIANAS)

From D-30 to D-8 and D-5 to D Day all sorties which are allocated to the support of ICEBERG will be directed against OKINAWA airfield installations and fixed defenses.

Any sorties which may be scheduled for D-7 and D-6, when the fast carriers are attacking OKINAWA, should be directed against airfields in Southern KYUSHU.

Far Eastern Air Force.

Initiate attacks on enemy air bases in FORMOSA as soon as the situation in LUZON permits.

Maintain neutralization of airfields on FORMOSA and the SAKISHIMA GUNTO following the carrier attacks on these areas.

Maintain search of the SOUTH CHINA SEA, STRAIT OF FORMOSA and the sea areas east of FORMOSA.

3. COORDINATION.

In accordance with the provisions of Alternate PAC-AID, the Commanding General 14th Air Force will coordinate the operations of the 14th Air Force and of the 20th Bomber Command.

The Commanding General, Strategic Air Force, POA, will coordinate the operations of his command with the 20th Air Force in the MARIANAS.

CinCPOA will coordinate the operations of carrier aviation and all shore based air forces assigned to the Pacific Ocean Areas. He will also coordinate the activities of all air forces under his command with those assigned to other areas.



4. AIR BASE DEVELOPMENT.

Air bases will be developed to accommodate the following air force:

|  |            |
|--|------------|
| 4 groups Marine fighters               | 288 VMF    |
| 2 squadrons Marine night fighters      | 24 VMF(N)  |
| 2 squadrons Marine torpedo bombers     | 36 VMTB    |
| 2 squadrons Navy heavy patrol bombers  | 24 PB(HL)  |
| 1 squadron Navy photographic           | 6 VD       |
| 1 squadron Photo reconnaissance (P-38) | 12 F-5     |
| 2 groups Army medium bombers           | 128 B-25   |
| 2 groups Army heavy bombers            | 96 B-24    |
| 2 squadrons Medium seaplanes           | 24 PB(MS). |

Eight airfields, four fighter and four bomber, and one seaplane base will adequately support this force.

Operationally, it is desirable that these units be installed as follows:

|                    |       |
|--------------------|-------|
| 2 groups VMF       | D / 5 |
| 2 squadrons VMF(N) | D / 5 |

Additional:

|   |  |
|---|--|
| 2 groups VMF                                    | D / 20 or earlier                      |
| 2 squadrons VMTB                                | D / 20 or earlier                      |
| 1 group VEM                                     | D / 30                                 |
| 1 group VBH                                     | D / 40                                 |
| 2 squadrons PB(HL)                              | D / 50                                 |
| 2 groups VBH                                    | D / 50                                 |
| 2 squadrons Photo                               | D / 50                                 |
| 2 squadrons PB(MS)(tender based commencing D/2) | D / 60                                 |
| 2 CV groups                                     | When construction                      |
| 200 replacement aircraft                        | troops available from other airfields. |

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Subject to adjustments imposed by engineering problems, these units could well be segregated as follows:

4 fighter fields, Marine, each to accommodate 1 VMF group. On each of two of these fields there will be additionally 1 VMF(N) squadron. Provision will also be made for 1 Marine wing headquarters. One of the VMF groups, and one VMF(N) squadron will be located in the southern portion of the island. The remainder of the fighters may be in one general area to the north.


3 Army fields, one for two groups of heavy bombers, the other two each to support one medium bomber group. One photographic reconnaissance squadron will be located on one of these fields.

1 Navy field for 2 VMTB squadrons, 2 PB(HL) squadrons, 1 photographic squadron, plus troop carrier terminal and transient facilities. 1 utility towing squadron and 1 drone squadron when NAKAGUSUKU WAN becomes available as a secure fleet anchorage.

One seaplane base for the operation of 1 squadron of PB(MS) and 1 Rescron and NATS seaplanes. /

If terrain studies make a different grouping of units desirable, or permit the use of fewer fields by interlocking dispersal areas, the segregation indicated may be varied.

PROPOSED  
FAST CARRIER TASK FORCE  
OPERATIONS



ICEBERG  
APPENDIX C  
NAVAL FORCES

1. ASSAULT SHIPPING

In order to deploy assault shipping to mount 6 divisions for the assault with 2 additional divisions in reserve, it is planned that ships be provided in the manner indicated in the following table:

|  | <u>APA(AP-APH-LSV)</u> | <u>AKA(AK)</u> | <u>LST</u> | <u>LSD</u> | <u>LSM</u> | <u>AGC</u> |
|--|------------------------|----------------|------------|------------|------------|------------|
| Assigned 7th Fleet for LINGAYEN  | 70                     | 19             | 120        | 10         | 30         | 4          |
| Est. overhaul required<br>after LINGAYEN                                   | 10                     | 1              | 40         | 2          | 5          | 0          |
| To be made available for<br>DETACHMENT from forces<br>employed at LINGAYEN | 15                     | 6              | 0          | 3          | 0          | 0          |
| Remainder available for<br>ICEBERG from LINGAYEN                           | 45                     | 12             | 80         | 5          | 25         | 4          |
| To be redeployed from<br>DETACHMENT to ICEBERG                             | 15                     | 6              | 0          | 3          | 0          | 2          |
| To be employed from New<br>Construction and from overhaul<br>to ICEBERG    | 30                     | 18             | 70         | 0          | 35         | 1          |
| Total for ICEBERG on D-Day   | 90                     | 36             | 150        | 8          | 60         | 7          |
| Additional for ICEBERG reserve<br>to be deployed from DETACHMENT           | 30                     | 12             | 20         | 0          | 10         | 1          |

It is expected that following the landing at LINGAYEN and after selected ships are returned to the West Coast for overhaul, the remaining 60 troop ships (APA-AP-APH-LSV) will be organized in 4 transport squadrons.

These squadrons should adhere approximately to the following operating schedule:

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|              |  |         |
|--------------|--|---------|
| TransRon I   | Depart LINGAYEN for MARIANAS empty                                       | Dec. 28 |
|              | Arrive MARIANAS (1800 miles)   | Jan. 4  |
|              | Complete interim upkeep  | Jan. 14 |
|              | Complete loading 3rd MarDiv for<br>DETACHMENT                            | Jan. 20 |
|              | Arrive IWO JIMA (780 miles)  | Jan. 23 |
|              | Depart IWO JIMA for MARIANAS with<br>3rd MarDiv                          | Feb. 13 |
|              | Arrive MARIANAS  | Feb. 16 |
|              | Complete unloading and depart<br>MARIANAS                                | Feb. 21 |
|              | Arrive SoPac available to load<br>one division as reserve for<br>ICEBERG | Mar. 1  |
| TransRon II  | Depart LINGAYEN for NEW GUINEA<br>with Casuals                           | Jan. 6  |
|              | Arrive NEW GUINEA (2000 miles)   | Jan. 13 |
|              | Complete unloading   | Jan. 17 |
|              | Arrive GULDALCANAL (900 miles)   | Jan. 20 |
|              | Complete interim upkeep  | Feb. 7  |
|              | Complete rehearsals 6th MarDiv   | Feb. 13 |
|              | Complete final loading and depart  | Feb. 19 |
|              | Arrive OKINAWA (2870 miles)  | Mar. 1  |
| TransRon III | Depart LINGAYEN  | Dec. 24 |
|              | Arrive NEW GUINEA (2000 miles)   | Jan. 3  |
|              | Complete unloading and reloading   | Jan. 10 |
|              | Arrive LINGAYEN (2nd Trip)   | Jan. 17 |
|              | Depart LINGAYEN  | Jan. 22 |
|              | Arrive LEYTE (950 miles)   | Jan. 25 |
|              | Complete interim upkeep  | Feb. 12 |
|              | Complete rehearsals 7th Div  | Feb. 19 |
|              | Complete final loading and depart  | Feb. 25 |
|              | Arrive OKINAWA (1000 miles)  | Mar. 1  |
| TransRon IV  | Depart LINGAYEN  | Dec. 24 |
|              | Arrive NEW GUINEA (2000 miles)   | Jan. 3  |
|              | Complete unloading and reloading   | Jan. 10 |
|              | Arrive LINGAYEN (2nd Trip)   | Jan. 17 |
|              | Depart LINGAYEN  | Jan. 22 |
|              | Arrive LEYTE (950 miles)   | Jan. 25 |
|              | Complete interim upkeep  | Feb. 12 |
|              | Complete rehearsals 96th Div.  | Feb. 19 |
|              | Complete final loading and depart  | Feb. 25 |
|              | Arrive OKINAWA (1000 miles)  | Mar. 1  |

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In addition to these transport squadrons released from LINGAYEN, two new squadrons which are to be used in DETACHMENT should adhere approximately to the following operating schedule:

|              |   |         |
|--------------|---|---------|
| TransRon V   | Depart IWO JIMA with Casuals                      | Jan. 27 |
|              | Arrive SAIPAN                                     | Jan. 30 |
|              | Complete interim upkeep                           | Feb. 11 |
|              | Complete rehearsals 2nd MarDiv                    | Feb. 18 |
|              | Complete final loading and depart                 | Feb. 24 |
|              | Arrive OKINAWA (1250 miles)                       | Mar. 1  |
| TransRon XVI | Depart IWO JIMA with one combat Div.              | Feb. 10 |
|              | Arrive MARIANAS                                   | Feb. 13 |
|              | Complete unloading and depart                     | Feb. 18 |
|              | Arrive ESPIRITU (2250 miles)                      | Feb. 26 |
|              | Complete interim upkeep                           | Mar. 8  |
|              | Available to load 27th Div as reserve for ICEBERG |         |

In addition to these squadrons, two newly formed squadrons from new construction will adhere approximately to the following operating schedule:

|               |                                   |         |
|---------------|-----------------------------------|---------|
| TransRon VII  | Depart PEARL                      | Jan. 22 |
|               | Arrive CUADALCANAL (3200 miles)   | Feb. 3  |
|               | Complete voyage repairs           | Feb. 7  |
|               | Complete rehearsals 1st MarDiv    | Feb. 13 |
|               | Complete final loading            | Feb. 19 |
|               | Arrive OKINAWA (2870 miles)       | Mar. 1  |
| TransRon VIII | Depart PEARL                      | Jan. 18 |
|               | Arrive NEW CALEDONIA (3400 miles) | Jan. 31 |
|               | Complete voyage repairs           | Feb. 3  |
|               | Complete rehearsals 77th Div.     | Feb. 9  |
|               | Complete final loading            | Feb. 15 |
|               | Arrive OKINAWA (3800 miles)       | Mar. 1  |

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## 2. FIRE SUPPORT GROUPS

It is desirable that the total fire support force be divided into three groups in order to:

(a) Provide fire support during rehearsals for troops mounting in LEYTE and in GUADALCANAL.

(b) Operate in relays at the objective, because the period during which fire support will be required extends over a considerable period of time.

The groups may be organized as follows:

| <u>"A"</u> | <u>"B"</u> | <u>"C"</u> |
|------------|------------|------------|
| 5 OBB      | 2 OBB      | 2 OBB      |
|            |            | 1 CB       |
| 2 CL       | 2 CA       | 1 CA       |
| 2 CL       | 1 CL       |            |
| 9 DD       | 4 DD       | 5 DD       |

Groups should operate in accordance with the following approximate schedule:

|         |  |         |
|---------|--|---------|
| Group A | Depart IWO JIMA (DETACHMENT D / 13)    | Feb. 2  |
|         | Arrive ULITHI                          | Feb. 5  |
|         | Complete interim upkeep rearming, etc. | Feb. 19 |
|         | Arrive OKINAWA (ICEBERG D - 6)         | Feb. 23 |
| Group B | Depart IWO JIMA (DETACHMENT D / 10)    | Jan. 30 |
|         | Arrive LEYTE                           | Feb. 2  |
|         | Complete upkeep, rearming, rehearsals  | Feb. 24 |
|         | Arrive OKINAWA (ICEBERG D - 1)         | Feb. 28 |
| Group C | Assemble in GUADALCANAL                | Jan. 25 |
|         | Complete rehearsals etc.               | Feb. 19 |
|         | Arrive OKINAWA (ICEBERG D - 1)         | Feb. 28 |

Upon arrival at the objective Groups B and C would combine to form the relief for Group A which could then retire to LEYTE for replenishment of ammunition.

## 3. CLOSE AIR SUPPORT UNITS

Of the 18 CVE now temporarily allocated to the 7th Fleet,

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it is expected that 9 will be returned for employment in DETACHMENT, after which they will be available for employment in ICEBERG. The remaining 9 will be returned to the control of Pacific Ocean Area Forces about 1 February, in time for use in ICEBERG; these are exclusive of CVE employed as oiler escorts and as ASW units; and are exclusive of transport CVEs.

These 18 CVEs should be disposed approximately as follows:

|  |       |
|--|-------|
| Screen for advance Fire Support Group            | 8 CVE |
| Screen for Amphibious Force mounting in LEYTE    | 4 CVE |
| Screen for Amphibious Force mounting in SoPac    | 4 CVE |
| Screen for Amphibious Force mounting in MARIANAS | 2 CVE |

#### 4. MINESWEEPING GROUP

The Minesweeping Group should depart LEYTE or ULITHI in time to reach the objective with the fire support units arriving on D - 6; this group should receive adequate air support from the escort carriers which accompany them and from aircraft of the covering force.

The approach to the objective should be on a northwesterly course leaving KOKA JIMA and KUME SHIMA to the northward then circling to the north, northeast and finally southeast in order to reach a disembarkation area along the western beaches of OKINAWA. The approach courses shown on Annex 3 to Appendix C take advantage of deep unminable waters where possible, through which the fleet can proceed without the necessity of sweeping. Although there is no evidence of mines immediately westward of OKINAWA, the final approach track for a distance of about 20 miles, where depths of less than 500 fathoms are encountered, should be swept on D-6 in order to permit close approach of the fire support group. The area adjacent to selected landing



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beaches inside the 100 fathom curve should be swept during the period between D-5 and D-1; this area contains about 15 sq. miles.

5. COVERING FORCE

Operations of the Covering Force are described in Appendix B. Battleships and cruisers are expected to be provided with HC ammunition to about 15% capacity; this should be expended against selected targets at the objective. After preliminary air strikes, the operations of the Covering Force will be governed by the activities of enemy naval and air forces, and by requirements for tactical air support at the objective.

# PROPOSED ASSEMBLY OF NAVAL FORCES

ANNEX 1 APPENDIX C

D-40 D-35 D-30 D-25 D-20 D-15 D-5

## GUADALCANAL

|        |       |             |        |       |
|--------|-------|-------------|--------|-------|
| 11 APA | 2 OBB | 18 LCI(G)   | 15 APA | 4 CVE |
| 3 APH  | 1 CB  | 6 LCI(H)    | 6 ALA  | 6 DD  |
| 1 ISV  | 1 CA  | 9 LCI(L)    | 9 DD   | 12 DE |
| 5 LSD  | 5 DD  | 20 LCT      | 1 AGC  | 6 DI  |
| 2 AGC  |       | 3 PC-PCS-SC |        |       |
| 50 LST |       | 6 YMS       |        |       |
| 20 LSM |       |             |        |       |
| 5 APD  |       |             |        |       |
| 6 AKA  |       |             |        |       |

## LEYTE

|        |             |       |
|--------|-------------|-------|
| 29 APA | 2 OBB       | 4 CVE |
| 1 LSV  | 2 CA        | 6 DD  |
| 2 LSD  | 1 CL        | 6 DE  |
| 12 AKA | 14 DD       | 6 DI  |
| 2 AGC  | 18 LCI(G)   |       |
| 50 LST | 6 LCI(M)    |       |
| 20 LSM | 9 LCI(L)    |       |
| 6 APD  | 8 PC-PCS-SC |       |
|        | 6 YMS       |       |
|        | 20 LSM      |       |

## NOUMEA

|        |               |
|--------|---------------|
| 5 APA  | For Troops in |
| 6 AKA  | Area Reserve  |
| 9 DD   | 15 APA        |
| 6 DE   | 6 AKA         |
| 1 AGC  | 10 LST        |
| 6 YMS  | 6 PC-PCS-SC   |
| 25 LST | 6 DE          |
| 10 LSM | 5 LST         |

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PROPOSED ASSEMBLY OF NAVAL FORCES (Cont'd) ANNEX 1 APPENDIX C

D-40                      D-35                      D-30                      D-26                      D-20                      D-15                      D-5

ULITHI

5 OBB                      24 DMS  
2 CA                      24 AM  
2 CL                      6 ATF  
18 DD                      2 APR  
8 CVE                      1 AKN  
6 DE                      4 AN  
6 YMS  
20 PC-PGS-SC

MARIANAS

15 APA                      2 CVE  
6 AKA                      6 DD  
9 DD                      6 DE  
1 AGC  
1 LSD  
25 LSI  
10 LSM  
5 APD


ESPIRITU

Units of Covering Force are not included, as this Force will be previously organized and assembled. The Covering Force will contain the following:

8 BB                      7 CA                      76 DD  
11 CV                      7 CL  
7 CVE                      4 CL(AA)

For Troops in Area Reserve

15 APA  
6 AKA  
1 AGC  
10 LST  
6 PC-PGS-SC  
6 DE  
5 LSI



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ICEBERG

Appendix D

Submarine Operations

1. DISCUSSION.

Commencing about February 1, it is expected that shore based aircraft operating from NORTHERN LUZON will effectively close the LUZON STRAIT to enemy shipping; will reduce the flow of shipping to and from the SOUTH CHINA SEA to a fraction of its present volume; and will constrict the area used by this shipping to a relatively narrow belt close to the CHINA coast. Unless cargo is transhipped by land carriers through CHINA, all ships carrying even this reduced cargo must pass through the FORMOSA STRAIT.

Inability to use this shipping from the southern area coupled with an increased demand for imports from North CHINA, will tend to increase greatly the volume of shipping from JAPAN to KOREA, SHANGHAI and other North CHINA ports.

The danger of being bottled up in the SOUTH CHINA SEA Area will probably induce the Japanese to move all important naval combatant units to the EMPIRE either before or immediately after our operation against LUZON. Thus the requirement for our submarines in the southern area should be greatly reduced.

2. TASKS.

The augmented submarine force in the Northern Area should be disposed to perform the following tasks:

- (a) Provide life-guard service in the vicinity of OKINAWA from D-30 to D-7; and in designated EMPIRE areas from D-20 to D-20; and in designated areas around FORMOSA and SAKISHIMA GUNTO from D-20 to D-15.

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(b) Provide strong submarine patrols south of OKINAWA JIMA and north of AMAMI O SHIMA in order to intercept and destroy enemy forces attempting to threaten our operation or attempting to retire from the area.

(c) Maintain patrols in areas around commercial terminals in the EMPIRE; in the area north of FORMOSA STRAIT; and across the shipping lanes from the EMPIRE to North CHINA ports; in order to inflict maximum attrition on enemy shipping.

(d) Be prepared to concentrate as required to provide strategic or tactical support of the 5th Fleet.

3. RESTRICTIONS.

Operating zones and bombing and attack restrictions will be prescribed in the Current CinCPOA Operating Procedure, with addenda and zone notices as required.

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ICEBERG

APPENDIX E

LOGISTIC MEASURES

Appendix E is based upon the logistical requirements for Phase I only.

ICEBERG

APPENDIX E

LOGISTIC MEASURES

1. OPERATIONAL REQUIREMENTS

The concept of operations requires:

- a. Early establishment of facilities for fleet anchorage with logistic support at NAKAGUSUKU BAY; and eventual development of an advanced fleet base.
- b. Rapid construction of airdrome facilities sufficient to support the air program.
- c. Expansion of the port of NAHA to support assault and garrison forces, planned developments in the area, and to mount forces for subsequent operations.
- d. Installation of service elements to accomplish tasks of development.

2. FACTS AFFECTING LOGISTICS

a. Approximate Distances From OKINAWA To:

|                 | <u>Nautical Miles</u> | <u>Approx. Sailing<br/>time (10 knots)<br/>Days</u> |
|-----------------|-----------------------|---|
| SAN FRANCISCO   | 6246                  | 26.   |
| PEARL HARBOR    | 4155                  | 17.3  |
| ENIWETOK        | 2145                  | 9.  |
| GUAM            | 1200                  | 5.  |
| ULITHI          | 1200                  | 5.  |
| PALAU           | 1200                  | 5.  |
| GUADALCANAL     | 2860                  | 11.   |
| MANILA          | 1000                  | 4.  |
| DAVAO           | 1360                  | 5.7   |
| CANTON          | 865                   | 3.6   |
| AMOY            | 535                   | 2.2   |
| FORMOSA (TAKAO) | 555                   | 2.3   |
| SHANGHAI        | 450                   | 1.9   |
| SASEBO          | 440                   | 1.8   |
| SHIMONOSEKI     | 485                   | 2.  |
| OSAKA           | 635                   | 2.6   |
| TOKYO           | 840                   | 3.5   |
| VLADIVOSTOK     | 1055                  | 4.4   |



b. Geography

OKINAWA JIMA, the largest island in the NANSEI SHOTO, lies between 26° 03' and 26° 52' N latitude and between 127° 41' and 128° 20' E longitude, commanding the sea approaches to the China Coast. The island was a key point in the communication between JAPAN and the islands under Japanese Mandate. It is a long narrow island (67 miles long and 3 to 10 miles wide), made up of plateaus and ridges with many bays offering sheltered anchorage. NAKAGUSUKU, the foremost of these, has long been used as a fleet base by the Japanese Navy. The island has a total population of 443,000 mostly concentrated in the southern half. NAHA, the largest city on the island, (66,000) is the capital of the island group.

c. Climate

The climate of the OKINAWA Area is controlled by the monsoonal circulation between the Asiatic Continent and the North Pacific Ocean. From October through March winds blow in a clockwise direction out of the region of high pressure in SIBERIA, and the resulting air flow over these islands is from the north and northeast. During April and May there is a gradual reversal in the direction of air flow, and from June through August the winds over the islands are predominately south and southeast, a part of the clockwise circulation around the center of high pressure in the North Pacific Ocean. During the transitional months of April, May and September, the direction of air flow usually alternates several times between northeast and south. Fog and dust rarely occur on these islands. The climate is sub-tropical to tropical with mean variation only 17° to 20°. Average daily maximum temperature in summer 85° - 88° with mean daily minimum of 72° - 79°. Air temperature in winter averages between 55° and 65°. Annual precipitation is heavy and by months is somewhat erratic. Frequently a day's downpour will equal the whole monthly average. In general summer months have the greatest precipitation. Winter precipitation, however, occurs over more extended periods than in summer. Average number of days with precipitation (.004 inches or more) are shown in the following table. Figures in parentheses indicate the average inches of rainfall.

|          | <u>NAHA</u> |
|----------|-------------|
| January  | 19(5½)      |
| February | 18(4½)      |

|           | <u>NAHL</u>           |
|-----------|-----------------------|
| March     | 18(6)                 |
| April     | 16(5)                 |
| May       | 17(10 $\frac{1}{2}$ ) |
| June      | 16(8)                 |
| July      | 16(7 $\frac{1}{2}$ )  |
| August    | 19(7 $\frac{1}{2}$ )  |
| September | 18(7)                 |
| October   | 16(6 $\frac{1}{2}$ )  |
| November  | 16(5 $\frac{1}{2}$ )  |
| December  | 17(4 $\frac{1}{2}$ )  |

The following table indicates the average number of days with specified cloud cover as of 0600 L.S.T.

|          |            | <u>NAHL</u> |
|----------|------------|-------------|
| January  | .7 or more | 24          |
|          | .4 - .6    | 2           |
|          | .3 or less | 5           |
| February | .7 or more | 22          |
|          | .4 - .6    | 2           |
|          | .3 or less | 7           |
| March    | .7 or more | 22          |
|          | .4 - .6    | 3           |
|          | .3 or less | 6           |
| April    | .7 or more | 21          |
|          | .4 - .6    | 2           |
|          | .3 or less | 7           |
| May      | .7 or more | 25          |
|          | .4 - .6    | 3           |
|          | .3 or less | 3           |

|           |            | N4HA |
|-----------|------------|------|
| June      | .7 or more | 24   |
|           | .4 - .6    | 3    |
|           | .3 or less | 3    |
| July      | .7 or more | 18   |
|           | .4 - .6    | 5    |
|           | .3 or less | 8    |
| August    | .7 or more | 19   |
|           | .4 - .6    | 5    |
|           | .3 or less | 7    |
| September | .7 or more | 19   |
|           | .4 - .6    | 3    |
|           | .3 or less | 8    |
| October   | .7 or more | 18   |
|           | .4 - .6    | 3    |
|           | .3 or less | 10   |
| November  | .7 or more | 18   |
|           | .4 - .6    | 4    |
|           | .3 or less | 8    |
| December  | .7 or more | 22   |
|           | .4 - .6    | 3    |
|           | .3 or less | 6    |

d. Topography

The CHIMA WAN, a bay on the west coast of OKINAWA roughly divides the island in two parts. The northern portion is hilly with elevations up to 1500 feet. The southern half is less rugged and is better adapted for the development of a military base incorporating an anchorage, harbor improvements, flying fields, and other facilities ashore, being mostly of rolling and terraced hill land.

e. Hydrography

The most important feature of OKINAWA'S hydrography is the existence of two large bays on the eastern coast - NAKAGUSUKU BAY and CHIMU BAY. These waters are extensive in area and offer good depths for anchorage. Large areas of land level enough for base development lie close to these protected waters. The chief difficulty in constructing ship unloading facilities is the width of the coral reefs which fringe the shores.

f. Water Supply

Because of the limestone formation of SOUTHERN OKINAWA, streams and other sources of water near the surface are scarce. Most of the many shallow wells to be found are polluted. It is believed that a sufficient supply of water can be obtained by drilling deep wells in certain areas. However, initially the employment of both distillation and purification units is indicated. NAHA had in 1936 a municipal water system supplying 400,000 gallons per day. It served 23% of the population as well as the wharves. There are 3,676 wells in the city, the water from which is polluted and unpalatable.

g. Survey of Airfield Sites

While complete topographic data is not yet available it is possible to locate existing airfields and tentatively select sites for others. Fields now operative or under construction are the NAHA Field (3 runways), MACHINATO (1 runway), KATENA (1 runway), YONTAN (3 runways), and YONABARU (1 runway). Some of these have well developed dispersal areas with revetments. The small island of IE SHIMA has a field with three (3) runways and evidences of two more underway. Most of the possible sites lie in the coastal flats in the southern portion of OKINAWA but additional runways of fighter length may be feasible in the northern portion.

h. Health and Sanitation

(1) General

There is very little direct information as to health conditions on the target. Due to the climate, water supply, type of sewage disposal and number and type of civilian population on the island, it should be assumed that health conditions will be poor. Mosquitoes are numerous throughout the year.

(2) Civilian Population

There is a low standard of public health and medical facilities on

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this island. Living conditions are inferior to those in JAPAN. Night soil is used as fertilizer. Rats and disease bearing insects are common. Some locally produced foods are said to be sufficient; however, rice must be imported. Nutritional deficiency diseases are present.

(3) Diseases

The following diseases will be of military importance:

Malaria

Enteric diseases (diarrheas, dysentery and parasites)

Scrub typhus

Dengue

Filariasis

Venerical diseases

Skin diseases

The following diseases are of potential importance:

Cholera

Plague

Relapsing fever

Schistosomiasis

Typhus

Tularemia

Yellow fever

1. Communication Survey

(1) Telephone, telegraph and cable

(a) Submarine Cable

OKINAWA has a submarine cable connection with FORMOSA and JAPAN via other islands of NANSEI SHOTO, and also with YAP. Terminals for these cables are in the vicinity of NAHA and SANAPI.

(b) Telephone and Telegraph Systems

NAHA is the center of a telephone and telegraph system connecting principal places on the island. Size and guage of the cables are unknown.

(c) All plans for communication installations should be prepared on the premise that no enemy equipment or material will be salvageable and that all necessary equipment must be supplied.

(2) Radio

Existing radio installations in OKINAWA Area are as follows:

IZENA SHIMA - one station - 45 miles North of NAHA.

OKINAWA - four stations within 3 miles of NAHA.

KUME SHIMA at GIMA - one station - 47 miles West of NAHA.

ZAMAMI or YAKABI SHIMA - one station - 17 miles West of NAHA.

AGUNI SHIMA - one station 32 miles Northeast of NAHA.

Existing lookout stations are as follows:

HEDO SAKI on Northern tip of OKINAWA.

KUME SHIMA.

CHIYAMU ZAKI on Southern tip of OKINAWA.

A power plant is located near NAHA NAIKO.

A radar tower is reported in vicinity of NAHA.

The southern portion of OKINAWA is apparently suitable for radio transmission and reception to East, South and West.

i. Public Utilities

(1) Electric Light and Power Facilities

The OKINAWA Denki Kaisha (Electric Company) supplies electricity for light and power in both NAHA and SHURI. The generators of this company are run by steam from coal-fired boilers and their capacity in 1938 was 2300 KW. It is believed that there are small generators in the larger villages and towns. No gas installations have been reported.

(2) Water System

The only extensive water piping system on the island was completed at NAHA in 1935. In 1938, it served 3,244 households with 400,000 gallons of water per day over 30 miles of pipe.

(3) Sewerage

NAHA has the only modern sewage system with  $3\frac{1}{4}$  miles of pipe.

k. Military Government

Discussion will be issued separately at a later date.

l. Transportation

(1) Roads

The rugged terrain features of the Northern half of OKINAWA JIMA have

precluded the development of even the primitive road not found in most of the Japanese Islands. The developing of a road system sufficient for our military needs would involve considerable equipment and time. Railroad facilities are not known to exist in this area.

The southern half of OKINAWA JIMA has a population upwards of 300,000 people, which would indicate an intricate road net for the area. The only road known to support two lanes of traffic is a short stretch of a few miles connecting NAHA and SHURI. This road is surfaced with stone blocks. It is doubtful if it would support American military traffic. Roads that correspond to arterial highways, appear to be only 12 feet wide and of coral surfacing. Other roads are probably like our country lanes. The use of horse-drawn 30-inch narrow gauge railroads is evidence that local roads will not support ordinary traffic requirements.

Until aerial photographic coverage is available to indicate otherwise, it must be assumed that a complete rebuilding of the OKINAWA JIMA road net will be necessary. Such expedients as one-way traffic, separate routes for track-laying type of vehicles and rigid traffic control are indicated.

The study of local materials available for road construction and the nature of the terrain in the southern half of OKINAWA JIMA would indicate that excellent roads can be constructed with modern equipment. Three two-lane all-weather highways, in and out of NAHA, will be required for military purposes including the moving of cargo handled at the port. A like number of similar roads will be required for the movement of cargo, to and from discharge facilities on NAKAGUSUKU WAN.

## (2) Railways

A 30-inch gauge steam railroad connects NAHA with West Coast communities on the southern half of OKINAWA. It is probable that these railroads have been used for transportation of the heavier military equipment used by the Japanese in the island fortification program. A cross-island branch also connects NAHA with YONABARU on NAKAGUSUKU BAY. To what extent the horse-drawn lines running south from NAHA to ITOMAN and north along the east coast from YONABARU can be adopted to military traffic cannot be determined at this time. Lack of information on the condition of road beds and equipment, and the probability of

destruction as a defense measure makes the use of the railway questionable.

m. Harbors

(1) Capacity

Little is known of the existing cargo handling capabilities either of NAHA Port or facilities on NAKAGUSUKU BAY. It is estimated that the existing waterfront facilities at NAHA will accommodate 50,000 MT per month and with improvement of shore transportation facilities increase to 105,000 MT per month. A moderate dredging program in NAHA Port to improve the channels for shallow draft vessels (LST, LCT, LSM, etc.) should increase the port capabilities by an additional 120,000 MT per month, aggregating a maximum of 225,000 MT per month one way. Present intelligence indicates that facilities in NAKAGUSUKU BAY will have to be new construction.

(2) Facilities

Existing facilities at NAHA consists of a 835 foot cement pier and a 475 foot cement pier, with approximately 18 foot of water alongside. The configuration of the harbor entrance precludes ships larger than an LST. It should be noted that the sinking of an LST within the harbor might immobilize the waterfront facilities. Aerial photography may disclose facilities in NAKAGUSUKU BAY of which we are not now aware. Additional facilities for small craft serving the fleet will be required.

(3) Berths

Bow and stern moorings to accommodate 10 ships will be required at NAHA. Ample anchorage areas are available at NAKAGUSUKU BAY.

(4) Development

Operations in the vicinity of NAHA will be from bow and stern moorings by large or landing craft to shore facilities. Piers or wharves for liberty ships are not practicable. Prevailing weather conditions make the use of pontoon type piers undesirable.

In the absence of intelligence to the contrary, it will have to be assumed that beach landings in NAKAGUSUKU BAY will accommodate discharge of cargo until shore facilities can be constructed. Development of 13 Liberty ship berths is desirable and should be constructed if practicable.



3. TROOP AND TONNAGE REQUIREMENTS

a. In setting up the troop lift and tonnage requirements, the following assumptions are made:

(1) Estimated tonnage lift per man

Org. Equip. Initial Maint.  
and Const. Material

|  | <u>Total<br/>Lift</u>   | <u>Initial<br/>Lift</u> | <u>Later<br/>Echelon</u> |
|--|-------------------------|-------------------------|--------------------------|
| Divisional Corps & Army<br>Tactical Troops | 5 MT                    | 2                       | 3                        |
| All other Troops                           | 10 MT                   | 5                       | 5                        |
| Subsequent Maint. Requirements             | .8 MT per man per month |                         |                          |

(2) Loading Capacities without Stowage

AP's - 1500 personnel and 2000 MT

AK's - 9000 MT

# ESTIMATED PERSONNEL LIFT

|                                     | 1st Month | 2nd Month | 3rd Month | 4th Month | 5th Month | 6th Month | 7th Month | 8th Month | 9th Month | TOTAL                            |
|-------------------------------------|-----------|-----------|-----------|-----------|-----------|-----------|-----------|-----------|-----------|----------------------------------|
| Div., Corps, & Army Tactical Troops | 159,000   | 43,000    |           |           |           |           |           |           |           | 202,000                          |
| Other Troops                        | 25,000    | 27,000    | 40,000    | 20,000    |           |           |           |           |           | 112,000                          |
| Replacements                        |           | 3,000     | 3,000     | 3,000     | 1,000     |           |           |           |           | (Omitted from Population) 10,000 |

|                        |         |        |        |        |       |  |  |  |  |         |
|------------------------|---------|--------|--------|--------|-------|--|--|--|--|---------|
| TOTAL TROOPS           | 184,000 | 73,000 | 43,000 | 23,000 | 1,000 |  |  |  |  | 324,000 |
| Assault Shipping Lift  | 160,000 | 45,000 |        |        |       |  |  |  |  | 205,000 |
| Flight Echelons        | 1,000   | 3,000  |        |        |       |  |  |  |  | 4,000   |
| Garrison Shipping Lift | 23,000  | 25,000 | 43,000 | 23,000 | 1,000 |  |  |  |  | 119,000 |
| AP's Required          | 15      | 17     | 29     | 15     | 1     |  |  |  |  | 77      |

(@ 1500 per AP)

1  
2  
3  
4

## POPULATION ESTIMATE

|                         |         |         |         |         |         |         |         |         |         |                             |
|-------------------------|---------|---------|---------|---------|---------|---------|---------|---------|---------|-----------------------------|
| Balance Forward         | -       | 184,000 | 254,000 | 294,000 | 274,000 | 224,000 | 174,000 | 162,000 |         | -                           |
| Total Troops from above | 184,000 | 70,000  | 40,000  | 20,000  |         |         |         |         |         | (Less Replacements) 314,000 |
| SUB-TOTAL               | 184,000 | 254,000 | 294,000 | 314,000 | 274,000 | 224,000 | 174,000 | 162,000 | 162,000 |                             |
| Withdrawals             | -       | -       | -       | 40,000  | 50,000  | 50,000  | 12,000  |         |         | 152,000                     |

Estimated Population 184,000 254,000 294,000 274,000 224,000 174,000 \*162,000 162,000 162,000 (\* Used as Basis for supply level)

## ESTIMATED DISCHARGE CAPABILITIES IN MT

|         |         |         |         |         |         |         |         |         |
|---------|---------|---------|---------|---------|---------|---------|---------|---------|
| 277,500 | 375,000 | 437,000 | 500,000 | 500,000 | 500,000 | 500,000 | 500,000 | 500,000 |
|---------|---------|---------|---------|---------|---------|---------|---------|---------|

Beach capacities estimated are for garrison type of cargo and are based on very meager information. A new study will be made as soon as aerial photographic interpretations are available. Experience in the PARANAS indicates that assault type of cargo will exceed these estimates during the assault phase.

ESTIMATE OF TOTAL MT OF ORIGINAL EQUIPMENT, INITIAL MAINTENANCE AND CONSTRUCTION MATERIAL

Div., Corps & Army Troops @ 5 M.T. per man 202,000 x 5 equals 1,010,000  
 Other Troops @ 10 M.T. per man 112,000 x 10 equals 1,120,000

TOTAL 2,130,000

ESTIMATE OF TONNAGE LIFT IN M.T.

|   | 1st Month | 2nd Month | 3rd Month | 4th Month | 5th Month | 6th Month | 7th Month | 8th Month   | 9th Month | TOTALS    |
|---|-----------|-----------|-----------|-----------|-----------|-----------|-----------|-------------|-----------|-----------|
| Maintenance @ .8 MT/man   | 147,000   | 203,000   | 235,000   | 219,000   | 179,000   | 139,000   | 130,000   | 130,000     | 130,000   | 260,000   |
| Build-up Supply Level   | -         | 27,000    | 36,000    | 67,000    | 130,000   |           |           |             |           |           |
| Civil Affairs **  | 9,000     | 27,000    | 18,000    | 18,000    | 18,000    | 18,000    | 18,000    | 18,000      | 18,000    |           |
| Div., Corps & Army Troop Totals   | 320,000   | 86,000    |           |           |           |           |           |             |           | 2,130,000 |
| Other Shipping  | 125,000   | 200,000   | 200,000   | 200,000   | 180,000   | 343,000   | 352,000   | 124,000     |           |           |
| TOTAL   | 601,000   | 543,000   | 489,000   | 504,000   | 507,000   | 500,000   | 500,000   | 272,000     | 148,000   | 400,000   |
| Lifted in Assault Ship  | 320,000   | 80,000    |           |           |           |           |           |             |           | 400,000   |
| Lifted in Garrison AP   | 30,000    | 34,000    | 58,000    | 30,000    | 2,000     |           |           | (@ 2000 MT) |           | 154,000   |
| Lifted in AK  | 251,000   | 429,000   | 431,000   | 474,000   | 505,000   | 500,000   | 500,000   | 272,000     | 148,000   |           |
| AK Required *   | 28        | 48        | 48        | 54        | 56        | 56        | 56        | 30          | 16        |           |
| (* Less Assault Shipping to be reused to lift Rear Echelons of Tactical Troops) |           |           |           |           |           |           |           |             |           |           |
| AK Involved (120 day turn around)   | 28        | 76        | 124       | 178       | 206       | 214       | 222       | 198         | 158       |           |

\*\* Tentative for estimation purposes only.

#### 4. CONTEMPLATED DEVELOPMENT

| <u>PROJECT</u>                                  | <u>CONSTR. TROOPS<br/>REQUIRED</u> | <u>M. T. ORGANIZATIONAL<br/>AND SPECIAL EQUIP'T</u> | <u>CONSTR. DAYS TO<br/>PLACE IN OPER. STATUS</u>            | <u>CONSTR. DAYS<br/>FOR FINAL COMP.</u> | <u>M. T. CONSTR.<br/>MATERIAL</u> |
|---|------------------------------------|---|---|---|-----------------------------------|
| <u>Field #1</u><br>4 VMF - 72<br>1 VMF (N) - 12 | 1 - NCB - 1115                     | 8959  | 40 days<br>(Strip / 20% Taxiways<br>& Hardstands)           | 180 days                                | 17,300                            |
| <u>Field #2</u><br>4 VMF - 72<br>1 VMF (N) - 12 | 1 - NCB - 1115                     | 8959  | 20 days<br>(Strip / 95% Taxiways<br>& Hardstands)           | 150 days                                | 17,300                            |
| <u>Field #3</u><br>4 VMF - 72                   | 1 - NCB - 1115                     | 8959  | 30 days<br>(Strip completed)                                | 180 days                                | 17,300                            |
| <u>Field #4</u><br>4 VMF - 72                   | 1 - NCB - 1115                     | 8959  | 40 days<br>(Strip / 20% Taxiways<br>& Hardstands)           | 180 days                                | 17,300                            |
| <u>Field #5</u><br>4 VMF - 72                   | 1 AvEngBn - 804                    | 7140  | (Activated for Fighters<br>3 days after seizure)<br>40 days | 180 days                                | 25,000                            |
| 8 VBH - 96                                      |                                    |   | (Strip / 30% Taxiways<br>& Hardstands)                      |   |                                   |
| <u>Field #6</u><br>4 VBM - 64                   | 1 AvEngBn - 804                    | 7140  | (Activated for Fighters<br>3 days after seizure)<br>20 days | 150 days                                | 17,900                            |

| PROJECT   | CONSTR. TROOPS<br>REQUIRED                               | M. T. ORGANIZATION<br>AND SPECIAL EQUIPMENT | CONSTR. DAYS TO<br>PLACE IN OPER. STATUS  | CONSTR. DAYS<br>FOR FINAL COMP. | M. T. ORGANIZATION<br>MATERIAL |
|---|--|---|---|---------------------------------|--------------------------------|
| <u>Field #7</u>   | 1 AvEngBn - 804  | 7140  | (Activated for Fighters<br>5 days after seizure)<br>30 days<br>(Strip / 85% Taxiways<br>& Hardstands) | 160 days                        | 25,000                         |
| 4 VBM - 64<br>1 Photo REC - 12<br>1 Combat Map - 12   |  |   |   |                                 |                                |
| <u>Field #8</u>   | 1 - NCB - 1115   | 8959  | (Activated for Fighters<br>5 days after seizure)<br>40 days   | 150 days                        | 18,000                         |
| 2 PB(HL) - 24<br>2 VMTB - 36  |  |   |   |                                 |                                |
| <u>Field #9</u>   | 1 - NCB - 1115   | 8959  | 50 days<br>(Strip, Taxiways and<br>Hardstands Complete)   | 180 days                        | 11,600                         |
| Seaplane Base<br>2 PB (MS)<br>1 RES SQN.  |  |   |   |                                 |                                |
| <u>Navy LION</u>  | 7 - NCB - 7805   | 50981                                       | 120 days  | 180 days                        | 109,000                        |
| <u>Army Storage &amp; Facilities</u>  | 3. Engr. Con. Bn. - 2845                                 | 16200                                       | -   | -                               | 21,600                         |
| <u>Harbor and Waterfront<br/>Facilities</u>   | 3 - NCB - 3345   | 27849                                       | 45 days   | 180 days                        | 42,000                         |
| <u>Road Constr.</u>   | 3 - NCB - 3345   | 21849                                       | -   | 180 days                        | 15,000                         |
| Misc. Constr. (dumps,<br>Depot, Hq. Hosp. Rehab.<br>Camps, Utilities, Civil<br>Affairs, etc.) | 8 - NCB - 8920   | 58284                                       | -   | 180 days                        | 100,000                        |
| <u>TOTALS</u>   | 3 AvEngBn - 2412.<br>3 EngBn - 2845<br>27 - NCB - 30,105 | 35,462 Total Personnel<br>250317            |   |                                 | 454,300                        |

NOTE: (1) Measurement tons of construction material for airfields and LION includes BuDocks tonnage in standard components of ACORNs and LIONS, or equivalent for Army and Marine Fields.  
(2) Const. Days for operational completion are days required on the site by construction troops with their equipment.

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5. EVACUATION PLAN

a. Casualties and Replacements

Estimate of Casualties

|                       |               |
|-----------------------|---------------|
| Dead and Missing      | 5,000         |
| Local hospitalization | 7,000         |
| Requiring evacuation  | <u>13,000</u> |
| Total Casualties      | 25,000        |

b. Surface Evacuation Facilities Required

Casualties will be evacuated by surface vessels from the target to the MARIANAS, supplemented by air evacuation as soon as suitable landing fields are available. Sufficient hospitalization will be provided in GUAM and SAIPAN to stage these patients. Evacuation from the MARIANAS to rear area hospitals in SoPac and OAHU will be by surface and air utilizing regularly established services as far as possible.

Surface shipping required. It is estimated that a total of 10 AH's will be required, to be utilized as follows: 2 AH's for Fleet Support, 2 AH's for evacuation between the MARIANAS and rear areas, 6 AH's for evacuation from target to MARIANAS. Evacuation from target will require the following:

|        | <u>Patients</u> |                 |
|--------|-----------------|-----------------|
| 6 AH   | 9,000           | (3 round trips) |
| 3 APH  | 2,100           | (1 trip)        |
| 13 APA | <u>1,900</u>    | (1 trip)        |
|        | 13,000          |                 |

c. Air Evacuation

Air evacuation facilities required:

| From   | To               | No. Patients<br>Per Week | Provided by      | Service Beginning   |
|--------|------------------|--------------------------|------------------|---|
| Target | GUAM &<br>SAIPAN | 500                      | ComFwdArea       | As soon as suitable air<br>fields are established<br>on target. |
| SAIPAN | OAHU             | 200                      | ComGenPOA (ATC)  | D / 21  |
| GUAM   | OAHU             | 200                      | ComAirPac (NATS) | D / 21  |
| GUAM   | SOPAC            | 200                      | ComGenPOA (ATC)  | D / 21  |

d. Care of Civilians

Instructions will be issued separately at a later date.

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6. LOGISTIC SUPPORT FOR THE FLEET

D a. General

Fleet units will utilize the harbors of GUAM, SAIPAN, ULITHI and LEYTE for logistic replenishment. Replenishment will be effected by fleet oilers, ammunition ships, supply ships and Naval Supply Depots in GUAM, SAIPAN and LEYTE.

Limited ship repair facilities will be available at GUAM and in ServRon 10 located in ULITHI and MARIANAS. Limited floating repair facilities will be made available at LEYTE by ComServPac.

Floating storage, fuel, provisions and GSK supplies will be provided by ComServPac.

b. Fleet Ammunition

Surface ships supporting this operation will be loaded with full complement of ammunition. Replenishment ammunition will be provided in AE's and AKE's loaded on the WEST COAST and located at LEYTE, ULITHI, MARIANAS or as directed by Fleet Task Force Commander. A reserve of Fleet ammunition will be available at the Naval Magazine, SAIPAN, and Naval Ammunition Depot, GUAM. Details of loadings of AE's and AKE's will be furnished Fleet Task Force Commanders by CinCPOA.

c. Fleet Fuel

Prior to the sortie from ULITHI by the Fast Carrier Task Force on or about 15 February 1945, all ships, all fleet oilers, and all floating fuel storage at ULITHI will be filled to capacity. It is estimated that there will be available at ULITHI, in floating storage, approximately 600,000 barrels of fuel oil.

Fire support groups and assault forces mounting out from ULITHI, MARIANAS, LEYTE, and SoPac as well as fleet oilers and floating storage temporarily assigned to these locations will also be filled to capacity.

Consumption of fuel oil for all surface forces engaged in the operation is estimated at 6,600,000 barrels, covering a period of approximately 30 days from departure from the various mounting points.

Commercial tankers will continue to deliver their cargoes to ULITHI via ENIWETOK, using convoy system between these two bases. Diversions will be effected by CinCPOA as necessary to meet mounting and staging requirements.

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Reserve fuel storage of 300,000 barrels will be available at KWAJALEIN, 450,000 barrels at GUAM, and 150,000 barrels at SAIPAN. Approximately 1,000,000 barrels will be available in SoPac forward storage, as well as 500,000 barrels at MANUS. These latter two storages will be available in emergencies only, subject to arrangement with ComSoPac and CinCSowesPac respectively.

It is estimated that PEARL storage will be not over 5,000,000 barrels as of 1 March 1945. The distance of 3,500 miles to ULITHI involving an average turn around period of approximately 26 days for commercial tankers places this reserve out of reach, as far as sustaining the operation is concerned once it has commenced.

Total estimated fuel required in the Central and South Pacific combined for the month of March covering the period of this operation may be summarized as follows:

|                                     |                      |
|-------------------------------------|----------------------|
| ICEBERG Requirements                | 6,600,000 bbls.      |
| SoPac Requirements                  | 800,000 bbls.        |
| MARSHALL-MARIANA-LEYTE Requirements | 800,000 bbls.        |
| PEARL Requirements                  | <u>800,000 bbls.</u> |
| TOTAL                               | 9,000,000 bbls.      |

Fleet oilers are tentatively assigned for distribution during this operation as follows:

|  |          |
|--|----------|
| *Immediate support basing on ULITHI<br>(Task Force Oilers) | 30       |
| Reserve support MARSHALLS-MARIANAS                         | 4        |
| Local support SoPac  | 2        |
| Maximum under overhaul                                     | <u>6</u> |
|  | 42       |

\*Com5thFleet will assign fleet oilers from this group as required for temporary service during the mounting phase of Amphibious Forces in SoPac and at LEYTE. In addition to the reserve oilers assigned to MARSHALLS-MARIANAS support, Com5thFleet will spot oilers in the MARIANAS as required for Amphibious Forces staging through.

d. Potable Water

In addition to the above, the following 3 AO's and 1 AOG are assigned



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to potable water service:

|            |         |
|------------|---------|
| SEVERN     | (A061)  |
| OCKLAWAHA  | (A084)  |
| PONAGANSET | (A086)  |
| TOMBIGBEE  | (A0G11) |

Each of the AO's carry approximately 100,000 barrels of potable water, plus the normal cargo of drummed lubricants and compressed gases of regular fleet oilers. The AOG carries 15,000 barrels of water. These vessels may be replenished at GUAM. Water supply is also available at MANUS and may be available at LEYTE, depending upon completion of water facilities at the latter base.

In the event the PASIG (AW3) and ABATAN (AW4) are completed in time they will be available for potable water service. Each of these vessels will have a distillation capacity of 120,000 gallons per day.

7. SUPPORT OF LAND BASED FORCES - GENERAL PLAN

a. Responsibility for Supply

ComGenPCA, ComGenFMFPac, ComServPac and ComAirPac will be responsible in accordance with existing policies for the initial supply of all units mounted in the Pacific Ocean Areas, and for the resupply of all personnel and organizations to be located on the captured objectives.

ComSoPac will be responsible for the provision of adequate areas and accommodations for the rehabilitation or staging of units moved to his area, and for the coordination of the logistic support of all elements of all services stationed in or mounted from his area.

b. Supplies to Accompany Troops

The following supplies, in general, will be necessary for the initial support of the operation:

Thirty (30) days of supply of all classes except ammunition.

Water in drums or in cans sufficient for 2 gal/man/day for five (5) days.

Five (5) CinCPOA units of fire for all ground force weapons except artillery and AA will mount with 7 U/F.

Aircraft munitions as follows:

Fighters

- 20 Missions

|                      |               |
|----------------------|---------------|
| Search Bombers       | - 5 Missions  |
| Strike Bombers (VBH) | - 10 Missions |
| Strike Bombers (VMB) | - 12 Missions |

c. Supply Levels to be Established and Maintained at the Objective

The following levels of supply will be necessary to furnish continuing support and to provide against losses in supplies from various causes:

Classes I, II, and IV (less construction materials)

|                 |           |
|-----------------|-----------|
| Minimum level   | - 60 days |
| Operating level | - 30 days |

Class III (less Avn)

|                 |           |
|-----------------|-----------|
| Minimum level   | - 30 days |
| Operating level | - 30 days |

Class III (Avn)

|                 |           |
|-----------------|-----------|
| Minimum level   | - 30 days |
| Operating level | - 30 days |

Class V Ground Weapons

10 U/F

Class V Aircraft Munitions

|                      |               |
|----------------------|---------------|
| Fighters             | - 40 Missions |
| Search Bombers       | - 10 Missions |
| Strike Bombers (VBH) | - 20 Missions |
| Strike Bombers (VBM) | - 24 Missions |

d. Reserve Supplies

(1) SAIPAN

Class I - 30 days for 200,000 men

Class II and IV (less construction and aviation material) - 30 days supply for 4 Army Divisions (reinforced)

Class III (less Avn) - 30 days supply drummed products for force of 100,000 men.

Class III (Avn) - 1,000,000 gal. AvGas and related lubes in drums.

Class IV - 15 U/F for 1 Army Division

20 U/F for 1 155mm Gun Bn

15 U/F for 1 155mm How Bn

5 U/F for 1 Tank Bn (Army)

15 U/F for 1 AAA Bn (Army)

(2) GUAM

Class II and IV (less construction and aviation material) - 30 days supply for 2 Marine Divisions (reinforced)

30 days supply for 50,000 Navy personnel

Class III - 30 days supply drummed products for ground force of 100,000 men.

1,000,000 gal. AvGas and related lubes in drums.

Class V - 15 U/F for 1 Marine Division

20 U/F for 1 155mm Gun Bn (Marine)

15 U/F for 1 155mm How Bn (Marine)

5 U/F for 1 Marine AA Bn

(3) Service Squadron TEN

Service Squadron TEN, located at ULITHI and the MARIANAS will be stocked with the following supplies:

10 days supply in self-propelled ships of Classes I, II, III (less Avn) and IV for -

|              |   |            |
|--------------|---|------------|
| Army         | - | 80,000 men |
| Navy         | - | 10,000 men |
| Marine Corps | - | 60,000 men |

e. Method of Supply

The following method of supply is tentatively established.

(1) Prescribed stocks for this island will be built up to established levels within 150 days.

(2) All units will be mounted with 30 days of all classes of supplies except Class V, and with 5 U/F.

(3) Essential maintenance supplies for 30 days of all classes (except Class III Avn, and Class V) for all elements of the landing and garrison forces scheduled to be at the objective by D + 35 will be loaded on the WEST COAST and sailed approximately D - 40 to arrive at ULITHI on D - 5. This shipment will be held at ULITHI for forward movement on call of Commander Expeditionary Troops. This shipment will constitute the first re-supply shipment and should include one

~~TOP SECRET~~

ship fully loaded with drummed AvGas (30,000 drums) and matching lubes.

(4) The second re-supply shipment should be scheduled to arrive at ULITHI by D / 5 for movement forward on call of Commander Expeditionary Troops. This shipment should contain 20 days supply of all Classes (except Class III Avn and Class V) for all elements of the landing and garrison forces scheduled to be at the objective by D / 35. One ship fully loaded with drummed AvGas (30,000 drums) and matching lubes, will be included in the second re-supply shipment.

(5) Subsequent shipment of maintenance supplies of all Classes (except Class III Avn and Class V) for the support of the garrison forces will be loaded and despatched from the WEST COAST to arrive at ULITHI at 10 day intervals beginning with D / 15. These shipments will consist of approximately 15 days maintenance supplies until the proscribed levels are reached. Thereafter, only sufficient supplies will be included to maintain those levels.

(6) ComServPac will arrange for barges and IX tankers loaded as below. These tankers and barges will be available at ULITHI as indicated to be forwarded to objective on call of Commander Expeditionary Troops. If not called for they will be forwarded to objective as indicated.

| <u>No. &amp; Type</u> | <u>Capacity</u> | <u>Cargo</u>                  | <u>Ready<br/>Date at<br/>ULITHI</u> | <u>ETA<br/>Objective</u> |
|-----------------------|-----------------|-------------------------------|-------------------------------------|--------------------------|
| 1 - AOG               | 12,000 bbl.     | AvGas                         | D                                   | D / 20                   |
| 1 - AOG               | 12,000 bbl.     | Av Gas                        | D / 10                              | D / 30                   |
| 2 - AOG               | 12,000 bbl.     | 6000 MoGas<br>6000 Diesel     | D / 15                              | D / 25                   |
| 1 - IX Tanker         | 70,000          | AvGas & Lubes<br>40,000 MoGas | D / 20                              | D / 35                   |
| 1 - IX Tanker         | 70,000          | 24,000 Diesel                 | D / 20                              | D / 35                   |

(7) Initially all fuel will be supplied in drums. Tank farms or other bulk storage will be provided as soon as practicable.

(8) Ammunition for re-supply of the landing forces will be loaded and despatched to ULITHI for shipment forward on call of Commander Expeditionary Troops. Shipments will be loaded and made as follows:

Five (5) LST's with Artillery ammunition to arrive ULITHI by D - 10.  
 Three (3) AK's each with 8 CinCPOA U/F for 2/3 of 1 Army reinforced division and 1/3 of 1 Marine division reinforced to arrive ULITHI by D - 5.

~~TOP SECRET~~

Three (3) AK's similarly loaded to arrive ULITHI by D / 5.

Three (3) AK's similarly loaded to arrive ULITHI by D / 15.

Three (3) AK's similarly loaded to arrive ULITHI by D / 25.

Three (3) AK's similarly loaded to arrive ULITHI by D / 35.

(9) ComFwdAreaCentPac will be prepared to make emergency shipments by air of rations, ammunition and medical supplies.

2.

FACTS AFFECTING LOGISTICS.

k. Military Government.

(1) Characteristics of Inhabitants.

The population in 1940 was 442,497. This is a population density of about 1,000 per square mile compared to only 243 per square mile on SAIPAN. However, since the population is concentrated in the southern portion, the density in that portion which we expect to develop is far higher. There are two principal towns, one with a population of 65,700 and a second with 17,500. The population is more than 20 times that of GUAM while the area is only twice as great. The natives of this area are not true Japanese. The area was semi-independent with political and cultural ties with China until 1879. Since that date the Japanese have imposed their educational and political system on the natives with marked success. However, the fact that practically all governmental, educational and commercial posts are filled by Japanese from the main islands and the fact that mainland Japanese look down upon the natives has led to some degree of resentment.

These natives are the same type as those found upon SAIPAN and TINIAN as the latter emigrated from the OKINAWA area in search of better living conditions. In OKINAWA the great majority of the people are small scale farmers and fisherman. The standard of living is lower than on the main islands of Japan. Generally speaking the people are poorly educated and will be apathetic both towards our forces of occupation and towards making any effort to aid themselves under the occupation. The small element of the population from the main islands will, if possible, be repatriated by the Japanese before occupation and those who fall into our hands will be antipathetic and must be placed under detainment pending screening and probable internment.

(2) Plans for Administration.

(a) Law and Order.

No figures are available on the number of mainland Japanese we may expect to find. However, to provide for internment of these and of such elements among the natives as may be potentially dangerous, provision must be made for an internment camp capable of expansion to hold 10,000 people. During the

~~TOP SECRET~~

assault phase this camp will consist merely of a wire enclosure and emergency shelter constructed of salvaged materials.

(b) Labor

Central pools of laborers will be established under Military Government officers designated as labor supervisors. The allocation of laborers will be on a priority basis and under uniform wage scales established by the Island Commander. Payment of wages due will be centralized under Military Government finance officers and be chargeable to the allotment of funds made available to the service involved.

It is estimated that the Military Government section of the Island Commander's staff will be able to furnish upwards of 30,000 civilian laborers should any such number be required. The rate at which they could be furnished will depend on the rapidity with which civilians come through our lines and the extent to which they have been demoralized by the preliminary assault. Such labor, however, will be very largely unskilled and will require provision of interpreters and supervisory personnel.

(c) Finance.

CNO Top-Secret Serial 0210513 of 9 September advises that the JCS have approved in principle the issuance of supplementary military yen currency for use in troop pay disbursements, military government, and other official purposes. For the OKINAWA area 300,000,000 Yen of this currency will be provided initially. Other yen currency, which is legal tender in the area, will continue in circulation and will be inter-changeable at par with the Supplementary Military Yen. Transaction in any other currency will be prohibited. No exchange rate between the military yen brought in by our forces and U.S. dollars has been established to date. All supplemental military yen will be in the custody of Military Government finance officers. Allotments will be made on request to all military units for troop payments and other expenses.

(d) Industry

Sugar refining on a small scale is the only industry of even minor importance on the island. As in the case of SAIPAN it is expected the mills will be destroyed and the sugar cane fields will be required either for military installations or to produce subsistence crops for the civil population.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

There are unimportant iron, coal and sulphur deposits in the North Central section, salt beds and a small quarry in the southern section. The quarry could be worked for building or road-making materials.

The principal agricultural products are sugar cane and sweet potatoes. Sugar cane is the commercial crop and sweet potatoes the major subsistence crop. Small scale stock-raising is widespread and pork constitutes a major item in the native diet. Fishing is important to the native subsistence. It is estimated that the displacement of the population necessitated by the development of military installations on the best agricultural land plus the cessation of fishing, dispersal of livestock and the demoralized condition of the population will make necessary the importation of food for the civil population and that it will be a considerable period before this can be corrected in part by importation of seed and implementation of an agricultural program.

(e) Resources Useful to Us

Aside from labor and a very limited amount of building materials no resources can be expected. An agricultural program and restoration of fishing can contribute towards the support of the civilian population.



TOP SECRET

5. EVACUATION PLAN

d. Care of Civilians

(1) During the Assault Phase. 340,000 out of a total population of 440,000 live in the southern half of the Island. It is practically certain that they will be cut off from any possibility of escape to the northern section and that the principal city of 65,700 and the principal town of 17,500 will be largely or completely destroyed. Based on the estimated number of civilians in the area, the anticipated advance of our lines and assuming 10% killed, it is estimated that the number of civilians within our lines during progressive phases of the assault will be as follows:

|        |         |
|--------|---------|
| D / 10 | 26,200  |
| D / 20 | 52,680  |
| D / 30 | 150,315 |
| D / 40 | 306,000 |

Shipping restrictions will curtail issues of food and clothing and the supply of construction materials to the barest minimum consistent with sustaining life and curbing the spread of disease. Principal dependence must be put upon captured stocks of food, clothing and salvaged materials and to this end all units must be indoctrinated with the vital necessity for turning over all captured stocks and all captured transport for the use of Military Government. Provision must also be made during later phases of the assault for the salvage, transfer and temporary storage of all such material.

Food. Subsistence for assault and garrison phases will be calculated on the basis of an 1800 calorie diet which approximate 20 oz. per person per day. Requirements for the first 30 days are estimated at 2000 tons of which approximately 600 tons should be loaded in assault shipping.

Water. It is anticipated that all sources of water will be polluted and that provision must be made for the supply of potable water for civilians. Rigid enforcement of the principle of sterilization by boiling will be necessary. Water purification and distillation units will be provided on a basis of providing one quart of potable water per person per day for a total of 240,000 persons.

Shelter. Shelter provided in the assault phase will of necessity be limited to that provided for the wounded and sick.

~~TOP SECRET~~

Administration. Twelve (12) Military Government camp units staffed and equipped to administer 2500 civilians each and capable of expansion to 10,000 capacity during the garrison phase will be established. These camp units do not provide shelter other than for wounded.

Clothing. It is to be expected that large numbers of civilians will come into our lines in rags. No clothing is provided in the assault shipping. Clothes, cloth and findings for 60,000 adults and 60,000 children, approximating 225 measurement tons, should be echeloned in by D + 30. Stocks of Red Cross clothing now available on the WEST COAST should be utilized for this purpose.

(2) During the Garrison Phase.

(a) Housing and Camps.

The Military Government camp echelons installed in the Assault Phase will be expanded during the garrison phase by utilization of salvage materials. Housing and buildings, other than warehouses, which are still standing or which are capable of restoration will be utilized for billeting of civilians. Civilians will be billeted on other civilians in undamaged areas where practicable. In accordance with the policy enunciated in JCS 1074/1 of 1 November 1944 and CNO Top-Secret despatch 062252 of November, non-interned homeless civilians will be afforded the minimum shelter necessary for the avoidance of disease and unrest. Existing local resources of materials and labor will be exploited to the maximum and the importation of construction materials for civilian housing will be restricted to the amounts necessary to maintain the foregoing standard when local resources are exhausted. Interned civilians will be afforded shelter equivalent to that provided for prisoners of war.

(b) Medical and Hospital Facilities required for Civilians.

It is estimated that 10,000 beds may be necessary for the care of wounded civilians during and by the end of the assault phase. However limitations of shipping and procurement preclude the furnishing of medical facilities in that amount. In order to furnish required minimal humanitarian medical care reconciled with and adjusted to the limitation of shipping and procurement the following approximate type of medical care is outlined.

ASSAULT PHASE

| Required<br>Number | Unit | Off. | Men  | Total | Meas.<br>Tons | Remarks   |
|--------------------|------|------|------|-------|---------------|---|
| 15                 | G6   | 120  | 1185 | 1305  | 5400          | 200-bed Tent Hospitals.                                 |
| 25                 | G10  | 25   | 150  | 175   | 1250          | Dispensaries for out-patient<br>care with 10 beds each. |
| * 16               | N2A  | 0    | 224  | 224   | 4208          | 100-man camp ) Housing for<br>Medical                   |
| * 4                | N4A  | 0    | 12   | 12    | 592           | 25-man camp ) Personnel                                 |
| * 3                | G14  | 0    | 0    | 0     | 6             | Field Dental Units                                      |
| 1                  | G18  | 2    | 4    | 6     | 23            | Epidemiology  |
| TOTAL              |      | 147  | 1575 | 1722  | 11479         |   |

GARRISON PHASE

|       |     |    |     |     |      |   |
|-------|-----|----|-----|-----|------|---|
| 2     | G2  | 0  | 0   | 0   | 6272 | 600-bed Quonset                                   |
| 6     | N5B | 0  | 0   | 0   | 1566 | Camp buildings to replace<br>N2A about D plus 180 |
| 1     | G4  | 16 | 172 | 188 | 1426 | 200-bed Quonset                                   |
| 1     | G18 | 2  | 4   | 6   | 23   | Epidemiology                                      |
| TOTAL |     | 18 | 176 | 194 | 9287 |   |


\* May arrive in later echelons.

# SEASONAL WIND ROSES


SHOWING PERCENTAGE FREQUENCY OF WINDS  
AT A HEIGHT OF 0-300 FT. AS RECORDED AT NAHA  
WEATHER STATION.

SCALE OF WIND PERCENTAGES


SPRING




SUMMER




AUTUMN



WINTER



NOTE:  
Ie Shima reported to have three  
hand-surfaced runways at this point  
as follows: 145/450', 145/500' and  
145/500'. Construction of 1000'  
runway, said to be possible.



## GENERAL NOTES


1. Sites of Airfields No. 2, 5, 6, 7 and 8  
based on incomplete data of first  
phase photographic interpretation report  
on sortie of 29 Sept. 1944.

2. Base map taken from H.C. Chart No. 2338.

## OKINAWA

POSSIBLE LOCATION OF AIRFIELDS  
AND  
OTHER FACILITIES

ANNEX I TO APPENDIX E



ICEBERG

APPENDIX F

TROOP LIST

S U M M A R Y   O F   P E R S O N N E L

ASSAULT FORCE

|                                  |         |
|----------------------------------|---------|
| (a) Total                        | 238,009 |
| (b) To be used in Garrison Force | 82,944  |
| (c) To be withdrawn              | 155,065 |

GARRISON FORCES

|                                     |         |
|-------------------------------------|---------|
| (a) To be moved to area             | 77,736  |
| (b) To be provided by Assault Force | 88,944  |
| (c) Total                           | 160,680 |

THIS TENTATIVE LIST OF ASSAULT AND SUPPORTING SERVICE TROOPS IS DEEMED THE MINIMUM FOR ACCOMPLISHMENT OF PHASE I OF THIS OPERATION ONLY. THEIR AVAILABILITY HAS NOT BEEN DETERMINED.

# ICEBERG

## ASSAULT FORCE

|                            |          | FIELD ARMY |      | ARMY CORPS |      | AMPHIBIOUS CORPS |                              |
|----------------------------|----------|------------|------|------------|------|------------------|------------------------------|
|                            |          | Army       | Navy | Marine     | Army | Marine           |                              |
| T/O                        | No.      | Strength   | No.  | Strength   | T/O  | No.              | Strength                     |
| Headquarters, Field Army   | -        | 1          | 1358 | -          | -    | 113              |                              |
| Headquarters, Corps        | -        | -          | 54   | -          | -    | -                |                              |
| Headquarters, Company      | -        | 1          | 560  | -          | -    | -                |                              |
| Hqs & Hqs Dets Sps Troops, |          |            |      |            |      |                  |                              |
| Type "C"                   |          |            |      |            |      |                  |                              |
| Hq and Service Bn.         |          |            |      |            |      |                  |                              |
| Hq & Hq Det Sp Troops,     |          |            |      |            |      |                  |                              |
| Type "D"                   |          |            |      |            |      |                  |                              |
| Divisions (not reinforced) | 200-35-D | 1          | 66   |            | 5    | 71000            | 3                            |
|                            |          |            |      |            |      |                  | 52200                        |
|                            |          |            |      |            |      |                  | (includes 2 in area reserve) |

## TOTAL

1984

54

113

71351

53417

## AVIATION

|                        |         |   |      |       |   |      |
|------------------------|---------|---|------|-------|---|------|
| VMTF MAG               |         |   |      | D-101 | 4 | 3468 |
| VMTF (M) Sqdns         |         |   |      | D-108 | 2 | 798  |
| VMTB                   |         |   |      | D-103 | 2 | 680  |
| F-5 Sqdn (Photo Recon, |         |   |      |       |   |      |
| P-38)                  | 1-757   | 1 | 342  |       |   |      |
| VBM Groups (B-25)      | 1-112 & | 2 | 3206 |       |   |      |
|                        | 1-127   |   |      |       |   |      |
| PB(MS) Sqdns           |         | 2 | 410  |       |   |      |

## TOTAL

3548

410

4946

## AAA UNITS

|                       |         |   |      |  |  |  |
|-----------------------|---------|---|------|--|--|--|
| Hq & Hq Btry AA Brig  |         |   |      |  |  |  |
| (On. Det.)            | 1-022   | 1 | 44   |  |  |  |
| Hq & Hq Btry AA Group | 44-10-1 |   |      |  |  |  |
| AAA Bn Gun Mobile     | 44-12   | 3 | 207  |  |  |  |
| AAA Bn Gun (SW)       | 44-15   | 2 | 1486 |  |  |  |
|                       | 44-115  | 3 | 1935 |  |  |  |

IOEBERG

ASSAULT FORCE

FIELD ARMY

T/O Army  
No. Strength

Heavy  
No. Strength

T/O Marine  
No. Strength

ARMY CORPS

T/O Army  
No. Strength

AMPHIBIOUS CORPS

T/O Marine  
No. Strength

AAA S/L Bn (SM)  
AAA Bn AW Mob  
AAA Bn AW SP  
AAA Bn AW (SM)  
AAA Bn - Marine

44-135 2 1694  
44-25 1 817  
44-75 1 709  
44-125 3 2289

F-175 4 5040

TOTAL

9181

5040

NOTE: Arrival of AAA units except those required for the assault to be integrated to conform with construction of airfields.

ARTILLERY

Hq & Hq Btry Corps Arty  
Hq & Hq Btry FA Group  
155mm How Bn  
155mm Gun Bn  
Observation Bn (FA)  
8 inch or 240mm How Bn

6-12 1 99

6-50-1 1 112 E-149 1 117  
6-12 2 198  
6-335 3 1617 E-135 3 1950  
6-357 3 1686 E-185 3 2178  
6-75 1 505

6-359 2 1178

TOTAL

1277

4118

4245

TANK DESTROYER

TD Bns

18-25 1 671

TANKS

Hq & Hq Tank Group  
Tank Bns Medium

17-22 1 101  
17-45 4 2916

(one medium tank Bn  
incl. orgn. in each  
Marine Division)

LVT (Tank) Bns

17-115 3 2331

F-1020 1 869

TOTAL

5348

869

# ICEBERG

## ASSAULT FORCE

### FIELD ARMY

#### Navy

T/O  
No. Strength

No. Strength

T/O

Marine  
No. Strength

T/O

Army Corps  
No. Strength

T/O

Amphibious Corps  
Marine  
No. Strength

## MISC. TROOPS

Army M P Bn  
Liaison Sqdn (Air)  
Field Depot (reinforced)  
Amphib Recon Bn

TOTAL

1252

2803

## CHEMICAL

Maint Det  
Depot Co  
Chemical Bn Motorized

TOTAL

847

## SIGNAL

Sig Const Bn  
Sig Repair Co  
Sig Radio Intelligence Coll-77  
Signal Service Bn  
Sig Bn (Corps)  
Photo Co  
Sig Oper Bn  
JASCO  
Sig Serv Bn (Sonic & Deception)

TOTAL

4386

844

1131

790

793

## MEDICAL

Med Bns

3-15

2

930

1

465

1

374



# ICEBERG

## ASSAULT FORCE

|  | FIELD ARMY         |          | T/O | ARMY CORPS           |          | T/O | AMPHIBIOUS CORPS     |          |
|--|--------------------|----------|-----|----------------------|----------|-----|----------------------|----------|
|  | Army<br>T/O<br>No. | Strength |     | Marine<br>T/O<br>No. | Strength |     | Marine<br>T/O<br>No. | Strength |
| Amb. Co Wtzd Sep                         | 8-317              | 1        | 93  |                      |          |     |                      |          |
| Evac Hosp (400 beds)                     | -                  | 4        | 908 |                      |          |     |                      |          |
| Evac Hosp (600 beds)                     |                    |          |     | 1                    | 232      |     | 1                    | 232      |
| Med Lab                                  | 8-611              | 1        | 58  |                      |          |     |                      |          |
| Med Depot Co                             | 8-661              | 1        | 178 |                      |          |     |                      |          |
| Malaria Survey Units                     |                    |          |     | -                    | 3        | 36  |                      |          |
| Malaria Control Units                    |                    |          |     | -                    | 3        | 36  |                      |          |
| Epidemiological and<br>Malaria Team G-19 |                    |          |     |                      |          |     |                      |          |
| Surgical Teams                           | -                  | 10       | 60  | 1                    | 102      |     |                      |          |
| TOTAL                                    |                    | 2227     |     | 334                  |          | 540 |                      | 606      |

## FINANCE

Finance Disbursing  
Sections

14-500 2 54

## ORDNANCE

Gp Hq & Hq Det  
Bn Hq & Hq Det  
Bcm Disposal Sqds  
Heavy Maint Co (FA)  
Heavy Maint Tk Co  
Depot Co  
Maint Co AA  
Med Auto Maint Co  
Hvy Auto Maint Co  
Ammo Co  
MM Co  
Evac Co

9-12 1 53  
9-76 8 200  
9-179 6 42  
9-9 3 594  
9-37 2 420  
9-57 3 558  
9-217 2 326  
9-127 3 360  
9-327 2 422  
9-17 6 1116  
9-9 6 1014  
9-187 1 185

Ordnance units  
in  
Marine Field  
Depot

TOTAL

5290

**ASSAULT FORCE**

## AVIATION SERVICE UNITS

**TOTAL  
ENGINEER**

(3 per Corps)  
(3 per each of 3 Divs)

|                      |        |
|----------------------|--------|
| 3                    | 3348*  |
| (one per Div (Navy)) |        |
| E-285                | 2 2012 |

2012

ASSAULT FORCE

|       |      |
|-------|------|
| TOTAL | 9507 |
|-------|------|

## TRANSPORTATION

|       |      |      |      |     |
|-------|------|------|------|-----|
| TOTAL | 8462 | 2098 | 3405 | 013 |
|-------|------|------|------|-----|

ADJUTANT GENERAL

|                    |        |   |    |
|--------------------|--------|---|----|
| Base P O           | 12-601 | 1 | 98 |
| Hq & Hq Det Rep Bn | 20-46  | 1 | 24 |

# ICEBERG

## ASSAULT FORCE

| Replacement Co | FIELD ARMY |                      | ARMY CORPS |                        | AMPHIBIOUS CORPS |                        |
|----------------|------------|----------------------|------------|------------------------|------------------|------------------------|
|                | T/O        | Army<br>No. Strength | T/O        | Marine<br>No. Strength | T/O              | Marine<br>No. Strength |
| 20-47          | 6          | 210                  |            |                        |                  |                        |

TOTAL 332

## GARRISON BEACH PARTY

3 240

## MILITARY GOVERNMENT\*\*

M P Bn 19-55 1 678  
Const Bn P-1 1 (incl. in  
Eagr Troops)

Misc. Personnel - 500

TOTAL 1178

GRAND TOTAL

62323

7328\*

13904

84839

69535

GRAND AGGREGATE TOTAL (ARMY, NAVY, MARINE) - 238,009

## NOTES:

- \* Includes 3348 Navy C.B. personnel listed in Marine Amphibious Corps Column.
- \*\* Tentative for estimation purposes only.

ICEBERG

GARRISON FORCE

FROM ASSAULT FORCES

ADDITIONAL

| <u>T/O</u> | <u>No.</u> | <u>Strength</u> | <u>No.</u> | <u>Strength</u> | <u>No.</u> | <u>Strength</u> | <u>No.</u> | <u>Strength</u> | <u>No.</u> | <u>Strength</u> | <u>No.</u> | <u>Strength</u> |
|------------|------------|-----------------|------------|-----------------|------------|-----------------|------------|-----------------|------------|-----------------|------------|-----------------|
|            |            |                 |            |                 |            |                 |            |                 |            |                 |            |                 |

All Services

Army

Navy

Marine

Army

Navy

Marine

ISCOM AND STAFF

Hq & Hq Bn

1 700

1 700

NAVAL BASE COMDR

Staff, NOB

1 250

1 250

SHORE BASED AIR FORCE COMDR STAFF

Hq & Hq Sqdn RS

1-800-15 1 256

1 256

BOMBER COMMAND HEADQUARTERS

1 251

1 251

MAW HQ

1 334

1 334

HQ & HQ CO SERVICE COMMAND

1 335

1 335

CORPS HQ & HQ CO AND  
SPECIAL TROOPS

100,102  
200-35-0

1 331

331

TOTAL

2457

331

1542

250

334

DIVISIONS - Inf.

2 28400

2 28400

AVIATION

VMF - MAG

D-101

4

3468

4

3468

# ICEBERG

## GARRISON FORCE

### TOTAL

### FROM ASSAULT FORCES

### ADDITIONAL

#### All Services

#### Army

#### Navy

#### Marine

#### Army

#### Navy

#### Marine

#### T/O

#### No. Strength

#### No. Strength

#### No. Strength

#### No. Strength

#### No. Strength

#### No. Strength

#### No. Strength

### AVIATION (Continued)

VMP(N) Sqdns

D-108 2 798

2 798

VMTB Sqdns

D-103 2 686

2 686

PB(HL) Sqdns

2 410

2 410

Photo Sq (incl Interp Sq)

1 500

2 410

F-5 Sqdns (Photo-Recon F-38) 1-757

1 342

1 342

VBM Groups (B-25)

1-112 & 1-117 2 3203

2 3206

1-127

VBM Groups (B-24) 1-112 & 1-117

2 3510

2 3510

PB(MS) Sqdns

2 410

2 410

### TOTAL

13324

3548

410

4946

3510

910

### AAA UNITS

Hq & Hq Btry AA Brig

44-10-1 1 75

1 75

Hq & Hq Btry AA Gp

44-12 3 207

3 207

AAA Bn Gun Mobile

44-15 2 1486

2 1486

AAA Bn Gun (Sm)

44-115 3 1935

3 1935

AAA S/L Bn (Sm)

44-135 2 1694

2 1694

AAA Bn AM Mobile

44-25 1 817

1 817

AA Bns Marine

3-175 4 5040

4 5040

AAA Bn AM Sp

44-75 1 709

1 709

AAA Bn AM (Sm)

44-125 3 2289

3 2289

### TOTAL

14252

9212

5040

### ARTILLERY

Hq & Hq Btry (Fl) Gp

6-12 1 99

1 99

ICEBERG

GARRISON FORCE

TOTAL

FROM ASSAULT FORCES

ADDITIONAL

All Services

Army

Navy

Marine

Army

Navy

Marine

T/O

No. Strength

No. Strength

No. Strength

No. Strength

No. Strength

No. Strength

No. Strength

ARTILLERY (Continued)

1 Hq & Hq Btry CA Gp  
155mm Gun (CA) (Sm) Bn  
155mm How Bn  
155mm Gun Bn  
Observation Bn

4-152  
4-155  
6-335  
6-357  
6-75

1 75  
3 1614  
3 1617  
3 1686  
1 505

1 75  
3 1614 (D/45)  
3 1617  
3 1686  
1 505

TOTAL

5596

3907

1689

MISCELLANEOUS TROOPS

T D Bn  
Tank Bn (Medium)  
M P Bn (Army)

18-25  
17-45  
19-35

1 671  
1 729  
1 556

1 671  
1 729  
1 556

TOTAL

1956

1956

CHEMICAL WARFARE

Depot Co  
Maint Det

3-67

1 184  
1 41

1 184  
1 41

TOTAL

225

225

SIGNAL

Fort Sig. Serv Co  
Sig Serv Organization  
Sig Const Cos Hwy

11-327  
11-27

1 165  
1 560  
2 504

1 560  
1 560  
2 504

1 165  
2 504

ICEBERG

GARRISON FORCE

TOTAL

FROM ASSAULT FORCES

ADDITIONAL

SIGNAL (Continued)

|                           | <u>T/O</u> | <u>No. Strength</u> | <u>Army</u> | <u>No. Strength</u> | <u>Navy</u> | <u>No. Strength</u> | <u>Marine</u> | <u>No. Strength</u> | <u>Army</u> | <u>No. Strength</u> | <u>Navy</u> | <u>No. Strength</u> | <u>Marine</u> |
|---------------------------|------------|---------------------|-------------|---------------------|-------------|---------------------|---------------|---------------------|-------------|---------------------|-------------|---------------------|---------------|
| Sig Constr Bn             | 11-25      | 1                   | 456         | 1                   | 456         |                     |               |                     |             |                     |             |                     |               |
| Sig Repair Co             | 11-127     | 1                   | 188         | 1                   | 188         |                     |               |                     |             |                     |             |                     |               |
| Sig Depot Co              | 11-167     | 1                   | 188         |                     |             |                     |               | 1                   | 188         |                     |             |                     |               |
| Sig Radio Intelligence Co | 11-77      | 1                   | 259         | 1                   | 259         |                     |               |                     |             |                     |             |                     |               |
| <b>TOTAL</b>              |            |                     | <b>2310</b> |                     | <b>1453</b> |                     |               |                     | <b>857</b>  |                     |             |                     |               |

MEDICAL

|                                |   |      |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |   |      |
|--------------------------------|---|------|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|---|------|
| Special Hosp #3 (aug)          | 1 | 355  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  | 1 | 355  |
| Special Hosp #4 (aug)          | 1 | 355  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  | 1 | 355  |
| Special Hosp #6 (aug)          | 1 | 157  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  | 1 | 157  |
| Special Hosp #7 (aug)          | 1 | 157  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  | 1 | 157  |
| Special Hosp #8 (aug)          | 1 | 157  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  | 1 | 157  |
| G-10 Dispensary                | 7 | 42   |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  | 7 | 42   |
| G-18 Epidemiological Unit      | 4 | 32   |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  | 4 | 32   |
| Optical Unit, Mobile           | 1 | 2    |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  | 1 | 2    |
| Fleet Hospital #106 (1000 bed) | 1 | 130  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  | 1 | 130  |
| Fleet Hospital #112 (1000 bed) | 1 | 287  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  | 1 | 287  |
| Base Hospital #4 (1000 bed)    | 1 | 328  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  | 1 | 328  |
| Fleet Hospital #116 (1500 bed) | 1 | 891  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  | 1 | 891  |
| Optical Unit Base              | 1 | 2    |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  | 1 | 2    |
| Med. Storehouse #2             | 1 | 55   |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  | 1 | 55   |
| Fleet Dental Clinic            | 1 | 24   |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  | 1 | 24   |
| General Hospital (1000 bed)    | 2 | 1180 |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  | 2 | 1180 |
| Station Hospital (500 bed)     | 2 | 702  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  | 2 | 702  |



ICEBERG

GARRISON FORCE

TOTAL

FROM ASSAULT FORCES

ADDITIONAL

All Services

Army

Navy

Marine

Army

Navy

Marine

T/O   No. Strength   No. Strength   No. Strength   No. Strength   No. Strength   No. Strength   No. Strength

MEDICAL (Continued)

|  |       |   |             |   |            |   |            |     |             |             |
|--|-------|---|-------------|---|------------|---|------------|-----|-------------|-------------|
| Station Hospital (250 bed)                       | 8-560 | 1 | 192         |   |            |   | 1          | 192 |             |             |
| Station Hospital (150 bed)                       | 8-560 | 2 | 244         |   |            |   | 2          | 244 |             |             |
| Station Hospital (100 bed)                       | 8-560 | 2 | 160         |   |            |   | 2          | 160 |             |             |
| Sanitary Cos                                     | 8-117 | 3 | 351         |   |            |   | 3          | 351 |             |             |
| Med Maint Team Type #2                           |       | 1 | 9           |   |            |   | 1          | 9   |             |             |
| Veterinary Det (Food insp)                       |       | 1 | 5           |   |            |   | 1          | 5   |             |             |
| Dental Prosthetic Team                           |       | 1 | 4           |   |            |   | 1          | 4   |             |             |
| Amb Co Motorized Sep                             | 8-317 | 1 | 93          | 1 | 93         |   |            |     |             |             |
| Med Lab  | 8-611 | 1 | 58          | 1 | 58         |   |            |     |             |             |
| Med Depot Co                                     | 8-661 | 1 | 178         | 1 | 178        |   |            |     |             |             |
| Malaria Survey Unit                              |       | 5 | 65          | 3 | 39         |   |            |     | 2           | 26          |
| Malaria Control Unit                             |       | 5 | 60          | 3 | 36         |   |            |     | 2           | 24          |
| Epidemiological & Malaria Control Component G-19 | G-19  | 1 | 102         |   |            | 1 | 102        |     |             |             |
| <b>TOTAL</b>                                     |       |   | <b>6377</b> |   | <b>404</b> |   | <b>102</b> |     | <b>2897</b> | <b>2974</b> |

FINANCE

Finance & Disbursing Det

1   27   1   27

ORDNANCE

Ord Gp Hq & Hq Det   9-12   1   53   1   53  
 Ord Bn Hq & Hq Det   9-76   3   75   3   75  
 AA Maint Co   9-217   2   326   2   326

# ICEBERG

## GARRISON FORCE

### TOTAL

### FROM ASSAULT FORCES

### ADDITIONAL

| T/O | All Services | Army | Navy     | Marine | Army     | Navy | Marine   |
|-----|--------------|------|----------|--------|----------|------|----------|
| No. | Strength     | No.  | Strength | No.    | Strength | No.  | Strength |

## ORDNANCE (Continued)

|                         |       |   |     |   |     |   |     |
|-------------------------|-------|---|-----|---|-----|---|-----|
| Med Maint Co            | 9-9   | 4 | 676 | 4 | 676 |   |     |
| Ammo Cos                | 9-17  | 3 | 556 | 3 | 556 |   |     |
| Ord Auto Maint Co (Hvy) | 9-327 | 1 | 211 | 1 | 211 |   |     |
| Hvy Maint Co. (FA)      | 9-9   | 1 | 198 | 1 | 198 |   |     |
| Ord Depot Co            | 9-57  | 2 | 372 | 2 | 372 |   |     |
| Bomb Disp Sqds          | 9-179 | 3 | 21  | 3 | 21  |   |     |
| Ord Med Auto Maint Co   | 9-127 | 2 | 240 | 2 | 240 |   |     |
| Hq Co Ord Base Gp       | 9-312 | 1 | 41  |   |     | 1 | 41  |
| Ord Base Auto Maint Bn  | 9-316 | 1 | 449 |   |     | 1 | 449 |
| Ord Base Arm Maint Bn   | 9-315 | 1 | 726 |   |     | 1 | 726 |
| Ord Tire Repair Co      | 9-347 | 1 | 145 |   |     | 1 | 145 |

TOTAL

4091

2730

1361

## AVIATION SERVICE UNITS

|                          |              |   |      |   |      |   |      |
|--------------------------|--------------|---|------|---|------|---|------|
| Service Groups Special   |              | 4 | 2800 | 2 | 1400 |   |      |
| Hq & Serv Sqds (MAG)     | D-115, D-116 | 4 | 2600 |   |      | 4 | 2600 |
| AW Sqds (M)              | E-691        | 4 | 920  |   |      | 4 | 920  |
| ACORNBS (less CBS)       |              | 2 | 1000 |   |      |   |      |
| CASUS                    |              | 1 | 420  |   |      | 2 | 1000 |
| PATSU                    |              | 1 | 316  |   |      | 1 | 420  |
| Airways Station (CT ARR) | 1-447        | 1 | 152  | 1 | 110  |   |      |
| CBMU                     | F-5          | 6 | 1662 |   |      | 6 | 1662 |
| Base Hq & Adv Base Sqds  | 1-422        | 3 | 370  | 3 | 370  |   |      |
| Aviation Sqds            | 1-999        | 3 | 759  | 3 | 759  |   |      |
| M P Co (Aviation)        | 19-217       | 1 | 104  | 1 | 104  |   |      |

ICEBERG

GARRISON FORCE

TOTAL

FROM ASSAULT FORCES

ADDITIONAL

All Services

Army

Navy

Marine

Army

Navy

Marine

T/O    No. Strength    No. Strength    No. Strength    No. Strength    No. Strength    No. Strength    No. Strength

AVIATION SERVICE UNITS (Continued)

Signal Co. (Aviation)    11-217    3    543  
Det Weather Sqdn    1    75

TOTAL    11721    2743    3520    2060    3398

ENGINEER

|                                |       |   |      |   |     |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
|--------------------------------|-------|---|------|---|-----|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|
| Base Engr Hq                   | 5-592 | 1 | 72   |   |     |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Hq & Hq Co Engr Const Gp       | 5-72  | 3 | 255  | 3 | 255 |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Engr Const Bn                  | 5-75  | 3 | 2703 |   |     |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Engr Petroleum Dist Co         | 5-327 | 1 | 228  |   |     |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Engr Dump Truck Co             | 5-88  | 8 | 912  | 3 | 342 |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Engr Base Equip Co             | 5-377 | 1 | 184  |   |     |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Engr Hwy Shop Co               | 5-357 | 1 | 178  |   |     |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Engr Maint Co                  | 5-157 | 2 | 400  | 1 | 200 |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Hq & Hq Co Base Depot Gp       | 5-592 | 1 | 75   |   |     |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Avn Engr Bn                    | 5-415 | 3 | 2421 |   |     |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Engr Parts S Plat              | 5-567 | 1 | 59   |   |     |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Engr Firefighting Plat         | 5-500 | 5 | 145  |   |     |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Engr Serv Organization (EC)    | 5-500 | 5 | 290  |   |     |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| S/L Maint. Team                | 5-500 | 3 | 9    |   |     |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Gas Generating Det             | 5-500 | 2 | 46   |   |     |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Engr Base Depot Co             | 5-267 | 1 | 160  |   |     |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Naval Const Bn (Avn)           | P-1   | 5 | 5580 |   |     |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Naval Const Bn (LION)          | P-1   | 7 | 7812 |   |     |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Naval Const Bn (Seaplane Base) | F-1   | 1 | 1116 |   |     |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |



ICEBERG

GARRISON FORCE

TOTAL

FROM ASSAULT FORCES

ADDITIONAL

All Services

Army

Navy

Marine

Army

Navy

Marine

T/O

No. Strength

No. Strength

No. Strength

No. Strength

No. Strength

No. Strength

No. Strength

TRANSPORTATION

Hq & Hq Co Major Port  
Port Cos  
CBS (Special)  
Base Cos  
CB Rgt Hq  
Pontoon Oper Bns  
Truck Cos (N)

55-110  
55-117  
F-1

1 528  
8 1840  
2 2196  
20 5000  
1 67  
2 2436  
4 460

6 1380

1 1098  
4 1000

1 528  
2 460

1 1098  
16 4000  
1 67  
2 2436  
4 460

TOTAL

12527

1380

2090

988

8061

ADJUTANT GENERAL

Base Post Office  
Base Censorship Det  
Hq & Hq Det Rep Bn  
Replacement Cos

12-601  
Est  
20-46  
20-47

1 98  
1 136  
1 24  
6 210

1 98

1 136

1 24  
6 210

TOTAL

468

332

136

NAVAL BASE UNITS

Garrison Beach Party  
\*LION  
Naval Supply Depot  
\*P T Operating Base  
\*Standard Landing Craft Units

3 240  
1 7031  
incl. in LION pers.  
1 217  
2 2960

3 240

1 7031  
incl. in LION pers.  
1 217  
2 2960

\*For details see Annex I to Appendix F

ICEBERG

GARRISON FORCE

TOTAL

FROM ASSAULT FORCES

ADDITIONAL

All Services

Army

Navy

Marine

Army

Navy

Marine

T/O

No. Strength

No. Strength

No. Strength

No. Strength

No. Strength

No. Strength

No. Strength

NAVAL BASE UNITS (Continued)

\*Rec. Station (2000 men)  
 \*Communication Units  
 Fort Cargo and Trans Unit  
 Fleet Canteen  
 Officers Club  
 Naval Ammunition Depot  
 Aviation Supply Depot

1 199  
 1161  
 1 200  
 2 50  
 2 40  
 incl. in LION pers.  
 1 400

1 199  
 1161  
 1 200  
 2 50  
 2 40  
 incl. in LION pers.  
 1 400

TOTAL

12498

240

12258

MILITARY GOVERNMENT \*\*

Central Administration 45  
 Public Safety (MP Bns) 19-55 2 1356  
 Finance and Supply 80  
 Economics 55  
 Law and Courts 32  
 Property Custodian & Claims 25  
 Engineering Public Serv (C Bn) P-1 P-1 1116  
 Public Welfare 130  
 Intelligence, Interpretation Public Relations 230  
 Labor 65  
 Transportation 55

1 678

1 678

45

1 1116

1 1116

\*\*\*-----

130

130

230

230

230

65

65

65

55

55

55

\*For details see Annex I to Appendix F

\*\*Pentative for estimation purposes only

\*\*\*500 Army personnel included in assault force

ICEBERG

GARRISON FORCE

TOTAL

FROM ASSAULT FORCES

ADDITIONAL

| <u>T/O</u> | <u>All Services</u><br><u>No. Strength</u> | <u>Army</u><br><u>No. Strength</u> | <u>Navy</u><br><u>No. Strength</u> | <u>Marine</u><br><u>No. Strength</u> | <u>Army</u><br><u>No. Strength</u> | <u>Navy</u><br><u>No. Strength</u> | <u>Marine</u><br><u>No. Strength</u> |
|------------|--|------------------------------------|------------------------------------|--------------------------------------|------------------------------------|------------------------------------|--------------------------------------|
|------------|--|------------------------------------|------------------------------------|--------------------------------------|------------------------------------|------------------------------------|--------------------------------------|

MILITARY GOVERNMENT (Continued)

|                          |    |      |  |  |  |    |      |
|--------------------------|----|------|--|--|--|----|------|
| Camp (250 men) M1A       | 8  | 176  |  |  |  | 8  | 176  |
| Camp (100 men) M2A       | 4  | 44   |  |  |  | 4  | 44   |
| Hospital (600 bed) G-2   | 4  | 1400 |  |  |  | 4  | 1400 |
| Dispensary G-9           | 8  | 40   |  |  |  | 8  | 40   |
| Camp M5C                 | 8  | -    |  |  |  | 8  | -    |
| Dispensary, Dental, G-12 | 16 | 32   |  |  |  | 16 | 32   |

TOTAL 4881 1178 1116 895 1692

GRAND TOTAL 160680 62124 7314 13506 24981 52421

including (a) from Assault 82944

(b) Additional Units 77736

ICEBERGANNEX ITOAPPENDIX FLION

|        | <u>Unit</u>                        | <u>No. of Units</u> | <u>Personnel</u> |
|--------|------------------------------------|---------------------|------------------|
| A-1    | Administration                     | 1                   | 175              |
| A-5    | Intelligence                       | 1                   | 9                |
| A-7    | Shore Patrol                       | 3                   | 69               |
| B-1    | H.E.C.P.C.                         | 2                   | 54               |
| B-2    | Underwater Detection (Augmented)   | 1                   | 102              |
| B-4(F) | Port Director                      | 1                   | 114              |
| B-4(C) | Harbor Patrol                      | 2                   | 58               |
| B-5(A) | Boat Pools                         | 2                   | 56               |
| B-6    | Surface Radar                      | 2                   | 90               |
| B-8    | Minesweeping                       | 2                   | 4                |
| B-9    | Fleet Moorings                     | 1                   | -                |
| B-10   | Navigational Aids                  | 1                   | -                |
| C-10   | F.P.O. (Augmented)                 | 1                   | 25               |
| D-1    | Storage Facilities (Augmented 50%) | 1                   | 975              |
| D-3    | Tank Farm                          | 1                   | 16               |
| D-11   | Drum Filling Plant                 | 1                   | 101              |
| D-13   | Cobbler & Tailor Shop              | 1                   | 11               |
| D-19   | Material Recovery Unit             | 1                   | 33               |
| E-1    | Combined AR, AS, AD                | 2                   | 1528             |
| E-5    | Ship Servicing                     | 1                   | 89               |
| E-6    | Mobile Amphibious Repair           | 1                   | 520              |
| E-8    | Small Boat Repair                  | 1                   | 68               |
| E-13   | Minesweeping Equipment Repair      | 1                   | 10               |
| E-16   | Oxygen Plant                       | 2                   | 24               |
| E-17   | Acetylene Plant                    | 1                   | 6                |
| E-18   | CO <sub>2</sub> Transfer           | 1                   | 4                |
| E-19   | Typewriter Repair                  | 2                   | 2                |



ICEBERG

LION (Cont'd)

|         | <u>Unit</u>   | <u>No. of Units</u> | <u>Personnel</u> |
|---------|---|---------------------|------------------|
| G-2     | Hospital (600 bed)                                  | 1                   | 193              |
| G-8     | Dispensary (25 bed)                                 | 3                   | 42               |
| H-14(A) | Tank Farm, MoGas                                    | 1                   | -                |
| J-1     | Base Ordnance                                       | 1                   | 16               |
| J-2     | Machine Gun Component                               | 1                   | 6                |
| J-3     | Ammunition Component                                | 20                  | 360              |
| J-5(A)  | Torpedo Depot                                       | 1                   | 57               |
| J-10    | Optical Shop  | 1                   | 5                |
| J-11(A) | Mine Assembly Depot                                 | 1                   | 69               |
| J-11(E) | Depth Charge Testing Component                      | 1                   | 4                |
| J-12(A) | Net Component                                       | 1                   | 70               |
| J-13(B) | Degaussing Component                                | 1                   | 21               |
| N-7(A)  | Camps (1,000 men)                                   | 7                   | 557              |
| N-8(C)  | Camp Buildings (Northern)                           | 7                   | -                |
| N-9     | Base Recreation                                     | 1                   | -                |
| N-10    | Base Education                                      | 1                   | 2                |
| N-12    | Laundry   | 6                   | 30               |
| N-6(A)  | Bakery  | 3                   | 54               |
| P-2     | Construction Equipment                              | 1                   | -                |
| P-8     | Port Development                                    | 1                   | -                |
| P-9     | Wooden Pier   | 4                   | -                |
| P-10    | Pontoon Assembly Plant                              | 1                   | 557              |
| P-11    | Truck & Equipment Overhaul Plant<br>(Augmented 50%) | 1                   | 835              |
| P-12    | Fire Fighting Component                             | 1                   | -                |
|         | TOTAL   |                     | 7,031            |

P.T. Operating Base

|     |                |   |    |
|-----|----------------|---|----|
| A-4 | Administration | 1 | 10 |
| C-3 | Radio          | 1 | 10 |
| C-8 | Visual         | 1 | -  |

ICEBERG

|        | <u>Unit</u>                | <u>P.T. Operating Base (Cont'd)</u> | <u>No. of Units</u> | <u>Personnel</u> |
|--------|----------------------------|-------------------------------------|---------------------|------------------|
| E-11   | P.T. Operating Base Repair |                                     | 1                   | 134              |
| G-10   | Dispensary (10 bed)        |                                     | 1                   | 4                |
| J-2    | Machine Gun                |                                     | 1                   | 4                |
| J-4(C) | Base Demolition            |                                     | 1                   | -                |
| J-6(A) | Field Torpedo Circus       |                                     | 1                   | 11               |
| N-1(A) | Camps (250 man)            |                                     | 2                   | 44               |
| N-5(C) | Camp Bldgs. (North)        |                                     | 2                   | -                |
| N-9    | Base Recreation            |                                     | 1                   | -                |
| P-6(D) | Fire Protection, etc.      |                                     | 1                   | -                |
|        | TOTAL                      |                                     |                     | 217              |

|        | <u>Standard Landing Craft Units (2)</u> |   |       |
|--------|---|---|-------|
| A-3    | Administration                          | 2 | 96    |
| E-10   | SLCU Maintenance                        | 2 | 122   |
| G-8    | Dispensary                              | 2 | 28    |
| N-1(A) | Camps (250 man)                         | 6 | 132   |
| N-5(C) | Camp Bldgs. (Northern)                  | 6 | -     |
|        | Boat Personnel                          |   | 582   |
|        | Estimated Additional Boat Crews         |   | 2,000 |
|        | TOTAL                                   |   | 2,960 |

|        | <u>Receiving Station (2,000 man)</u> |   |     |
|--------|--------------------------------------|---|-----|
| A-3    | Administration                       | 1 | 48  |
| N-7(A) | Camps (1,000 man)                    | 2 | 81  |
| N-7(C) | Camp Bldgs. (Northern)               | 2 | -   |
| G-7    | Dispensary (50 bed)                  |   | 70  |
|        | TOTAL                                |   | 199 |

|  | <u>Navy Communication Units</u> |   |       |
|--|---------------------------------|---|-------|
|  | Mobile Units                    | - | 375   |
|  | Administrative Dets.            | - | 92    |
|  | Garrison Units                  | - | 390   |
|  | Camp - Administration           | - | 130   |
|  | FruPac                          | - | 174   |
|  | TOTAL                           |   | 1,161 |

ICEBERG

APPENDIX G

PHASE II

SEIZURE OF IE SHIMA AND OPERATIONS  
ON OKINAWA SUBSEQUENT TO PHASE I

1. GENERAL

Phase II will be initiated as soon as it is apparent that the necessary combat troops and fire support ships may be diverted from Phase I Operations. This date, W-Day, will be selected by the Commanding General Expeditionary Troops. For planning purposes W-Day is assumed to be D plus 30.

The scheme of maneuver will be designed to provide early seizure of IE SHIMA and initiation of a major airfield development, and occupation of OKINAWA to the extent required for security of our installations on IE SHIMA and establishment of control over the entire island of OKINAWA.

There is insufficient information available at present to warrant the assumption that favorable sites for air or naval development will be secured in the northern portion of OKINAWA.

2. GROUND FORCES

It is estimated that in this phase the seizure of IE SHIMA and OKINAWA southwest of a line joining KAWATA WAN (26° 38' N 128° 9' E) and SHANA WAN (26° 40' N 128° 7' E) will require two corps of two divisions each. One corps will probably be employed in a land advance to the northeast from positions held at the conclusion of Phase I. The other corps will be available for amphibious operations to seize IE SHIMA and MOTOBU PENINSULA and to envelop Japanese forces opposing our land advance.

After the line KAWATA WAN - SHANA WAN has been established, the Commanding General Expeditionary Troops will

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proceed to gain control of the remainder of the island to such a degree as to assure the security of our position. A corps of three divisions should be sufficient to establish and maintain this control throughout OKINAWA JIMA and IE SHIMA, thus making it possible to release the remaining divisions for third phase operations.

As soon as it becomes evident that Japanese forces have been disorganized and enemy capabilities reduced to passive resistance the number of divisions in the OKINAWA - IE SHIMA Area may be reduced to two.

### 3. AIR FORCES

IE SHIMA will be developed as an air base for the operation of two heavy bomb groups and two long range fighter groups. It is estimated that these fields will be operational for fighters by W / 10 and for bombers by W / 50.

#### Alternate

The tactical situation in Phase I may require early capture and initial development of IE SHIMA, with forces provided for Phase I, in order to provide additional shore based air support. In this case the two fighter groups, one Army and one Marine, with supporting and service troops, scheduled for installation on OKINAWA will be utilized for this contingency. If so used, the facilities acquired at IE SHIMA will make acceptable a delay in activation of two airfields on OKINAWA. If such a diversion of forces is made those listed herein will be available for activation of airfields on OKINAWA.

### 4. NAVAL FORCES

Upon completion of Phase I, it will be desirable for reasons of security to retain in the immediate area only those units of the fire support force as will be required for the

~~TOP SECRET~~

prosecution of Phase II. It is estimated that this will comprise about one half of the fire support force initially committed. This reduced force will be available to support the shore-to-shore operation against IE SHIMA, and the advance northward on OKINAWA as required.

It is expected that a covering force of reduced strength, carriers and battleships, will be required to remain within striking distance of OKINAWA throughout Phase II and for an indefinite period thereafter in order to prevent enemy surface ship raids, to augment the shore based air defenses, and to strike adjacent enemy positions.

Landing craft will be retained in sufficient numbers to implement the shore-to-shore assault on IE SHIMA, to provide means for shore-to-shore amphibious assaults in the northern part of OKINAWA and for use in unloading cargo ships supporting the operation.

No naval facilities other than small craft repair and minor harbor services are planned for IE SHIMA. It is expected that various bays and inlets will be discovered in the northern portion of OKINAWA which will be suitable for PT bases and for other small craft anchorages. It is not intended that any provision be made at the present time for naval shore establishment or nets except in NAKAGUSUKU WAN, KERAMA RETTO and NAHA; destroyer mooring buoys and secondary navigation buoys however should be available for several small craft anchorages which are expected to become available.

5. FORCES REQUIRED

a. Ground Force

From

IE SHIMA

Assault

1 Division

Phase I

Garrison

1 RCT  
1 Bn AAA Gun (reinf)  
(Army)

From

Assault force

OKINAWA

As directed by ComGen  
10th Army

Phase I

b. Air Forces

IE SHIMA

Garrison

2 Gps VBH (Army)  
2 Gps VF (Army)  
4 Air service groups  
(Sp)(Army)  
2 Avn Engr Bns  
  
1 A.W. Squadron

1 PALAU - 1 U.S.  
U.S.  
  
1 PALAU - 3 U.S.  
MARIANAS if available,  
or U.S.

c. Naval Forces

Covering Force

3 CV            3 CL  
1 CVL           18 DD  
2-3 BB  
2 CB or 3 CA

Fire Support Force

4 OBB           18 DD  
2 CA            9 LCI(G)  
2 CL

Air Support Force

None

Assault Shipping

30 LST           50 LCM  
36 LCI(L)       150 LCVF  
20 LSM

Base Defense & Support Force

None

d. Service Units - See Annex 2.

## ICEBERG

### ANNEX 1 TO APPENDIX G

#### LOGISTIC MEASURES - PHASE II

##### 1. GENERAL

In addition to the logistic measures discussed in Appendix E to Phase I the following factors applicable to Phase II are significant.

##### 2. FACTS AFFECTING LOGISTICS

###### a. Terrain

IL SHIMA lies on the northwest side of OKINAWA at a distance of three miles from the tip of MOTOBU PENINSULA. It is a limestone island, roughly oval in form, five miles long and two miles wide. This island contains approximately 5500 acres, nearly all of which area is sufficiently level for development purposes. The island is topped by a nearly level plateau which averages about 150 feet above sea level. This area appears to have been intensively cultivated. Near the eastern end is a volcanic plug about 555 feet high called IKOSUKU YAMA or "Sugar Loaf" at the south base of which lies a large village. A major air base development has been undertaken by the enemy.

###### b. Water Supply

It is believed that an ample supply of water can be developed by drilling wells in the center of the island down to approximately sea level. In the case of this island a depth of 150 - 200 feet is indicated. The enemy has probably developed a water supply system which might be salvaged.

###### c. Harbors

There is no sheltered anchorage area adjoining the island. Berthing facilities are few and concentrated near the village on the southeast shore. This is the leeward side of the islands for the prevailing winds of northerly directions. These facilities are located on embayments in the coral reef on the Southeast shore. They appear to be of solid construction. The wharf on the west side is not yet completed.

It does not appear that the water alongside these structures is deep enough to accommodate anything but small boats or barges at high tide. There is no protection for small craft against southerly blows and it seems not unlikely that the small developed harbor at TOGUIGHI Harbor (dredged to 6½ ft. in 1939) may serve for the transshipment of supplies for the support of the IJ SHIMA Air Base, particularly during a period of winds from the south.

In view of the difficulty or impossibility of providing protected berthing for large ships here lightering must be considered as the only practicable means of supply. Tanker moorings could be installed on the south side of the island for delivery of fuel by submarine hose.

d. Beach Capacities

The southern and eastern shores have four firm, coral and sand beaches from 9 to 35 yards wide and 125 to 900 yards long. The remainder of the island is bounded by rocky sea-cliffs.

A fringing reef 360 to 720 yards wide with scattered coral heads, and without channels, borders the island.

Moderate slopes lead inland from all beaches, rising about 20 feet to a border of casuarina trees. Scattered clumps of trees form two rather distant lines between the casuarinas and the airfield.

Interruption of the tree fringe behind the beaches, and breaks in the slope offer good exits in addition to the roads and trails leading inland from all beaches. These roads join with the predominantly east-west road net which links all portions of the island. Several of the roads appear to be about six to eight feet wide and unsurfaced, although several such as the southern coast road, 135 yards inland, are about 12 feet wide and coral surfaced.

It is estimated that the above beaches will afford unloading capacities totaling 75,000 MT/Mo.



### 3. CONTEMPLATED DEVELOPMENT

#### a. Airfield Development

IL SHIMA is well adapted to the construction of flying fields because of its relatively level terrain. Approach conditions are over water and are ideal. Much enemy construction here can conveniently be used again.

Photographic coverage shows four parallel runways which can be made ready in a comparatively short time.

Field No. 1. Photographic coverage of 10 October 1944 showed that this runway was cleared by the enemy without any grading.

Field No. 2. The runway was graded and surfaced to a length of approximately 5000 feet on 10 October 1944. A cross runway 4300 feet long, together with taxiways and hardstands, had also been completed at that date, and can probably be used again. It is planned to increase the main runway to 7000 feet for use by VBH.

Field No. 3. As of 10 October 1944 one runway at this field was operational for a length of approximately 5100 feet. A taxiway system with hardstands was partly completed, and a second runway at an angle seems to have been under construction. It is proposed to recondition the present runway for fighter planes without adding to its length.

Field No. 4. This field will be of entirely new construction at the east end of the island. It is to have a runway of 5500 feet in length.

Ready Dates. Estimated ready dates for airfields on IE SHIMA are tabulated below. These dates are predicated on:

- (1) Employment of three (3) Aviation Engineer Battalions.
- (2) Availability of the sites for commencing work by W / 5.

#### Field No.

|                                    | 1 | 2    | 3    | 4    |
|------------------------------------|---|------|------|------|
| Operational for VF (4500' runway)  |   | W/10 | W/10 | W/50 |
| Operational for VBH (6000' runway) |   | W/90 | W/50 |      |

Final completion of the entire development is estimated at W / 230, and will provide for 5500' runways for VF and 7000' runways for VBH Fields.

**b. Naval Facilities**

No facilities for support of Naval Units other than small craft is contemplated.

**c. Harbor Development and Waterfront Facilities**

Installation of tanker and AvGas and MoGas barge moorings off southern shore for delivery of AvGas and MoGas by submarine line.

Transshipment from OKINAWA utilizing small craft will not be practicable during the early stages of development. Personnel and equipment for unloading AKs and APs from moorings at IE SHIMA must be provided during this period. Subsequent to the establishment of adequate port facilities on OKINAWA and when the inbound traffic on that island has passed its peak, transshipment from OKINAWA to IE SHIMA in small craft may be resorted to and some labor on IE SHIMA may be relieved. At this time the amount of labor required on OKINAWA will be increased accordingly.

Installation of AK moorings off southern shore with utilization of individual ship protective nets.

Installation of aids to navigation.

**4. MEDICAL FACILITIES AND EVACUATION POLICY**

**a. Estimate of Casualties:**

|                       |              |
|-----------------------|--------------|
| Dead and missing      | 800          |
| Local hospitalization | 800          |
| Requiring evacuation  | <u>2,400</u> |
| Total Casualties      | 4,000        |

**b. Evacuation**

Casualties will be evacuated by available LSTs, APs and APs to the MARIANAS. If LSTs or smaller vessels are utilized, casualties will be evacuated to OKINAWA for further evacuation by surface or air.

c. Hospitalization

Initially, hospitalization will be provided by mobile hospital units. Subsequent to the assault phase, hospitalization will be provided as directed in the base development plan, and as indicated in the garrison troop list.

d. Medical Care for Civilians

Assault: Estimated casualties, 700. Requiring hospitalization, 350. During the assault phase, civilian casualties will be handled by medical units designated for Military Government, assigned to the assault division. After the assault phase, civilians will be cared for by medical units designated for Military Government. Civilian casualties will not be evacuated from the island.

Garrison: Medical care of civilians by units assigned to garrison forces.

5. SUPPORT OF LAND BASED FORCES

a. Method of Supply

The primary method of supply will be by direct maintenance shipments from the West Coast.

When practicable the supply of Assault and Garrison Forces will be by utilization of LCTs, LSTs and other small craft from the port of NAHA or other accessible loading points on OKINAWA. Due to lack of facilities and heavy requirements for OKINAWA, transshipment may not be practicable in the early stages.

Provision should be made for AK moorings to unload at IE SHIMA any ships of regularly scheduled maintenance shipments, or any other cargo ship, assigned to the support of this operation.

b. Responsibilities for Supply, Levels of Supply and Supplies to Accompany Troops

The same general provisions as obtained in Phase I will apply in Phase II.

c. Shipping Instructions

A separate shipping designation for IE SHIMA will be assigned to

~~TOP SECRET~~

facilitate direct maintenance shipments to this port.

6. MILITARY GOVERNMENT

a. Assault Phase


During the assault phase Military Government functions in IE SHIMA will be performed by the Military Government detachments, including medical, which are regularly assigned to the assault division.

b. Garrison Phase

Upon completion of the assault phase, the Military Government detachments assigned to the assault division will revert to the control of the garrison commander. These detachments will be augmented when practicable by one Military Government Camp Unit to be carried in garrison shipping. This unit is in addition to those previously provided for Phase I.

7. SERVICE TROOPS

Unless otherwise indicated in Annex 2 to Appendix G - Phase II, all service units will be in addition to those listed for Phase I.



### GENERAL NOTES

1. SOURCES OF INFORMATION--  
USING CHART NO 1595, HORIZONTAL & VERTICAL CONTROL  
& HYDROGRAPHY.  
AERIAL PHOTO--  
(a) 7473-15  
(b) 7473-16  
(c) 7473-17  
(d) 7473-18  
(e) 7473-19  
(f) 7473-20  
(g) 7473-21  
ADVANCE SHEET OF MULTIPLEX A.M.S. - 1591.
2. SOLID CONTOUR BY STEREO-COMPARISON FROM SOURCE 1b  
USING SOURCE 1a AS BASIC CONTROL.
3. DOTTED CONTOUR INTERPOLATED FROM SOURCE 1b USING  
PHOTOS 7551-15/16.
4. BASE MAP PREPARED IN HAWAIIAN AREA CONSTRUCTION  
BUREAU STARTING WORK FOR 48 SECTION.
5. AIRFIELDS AND BEACHES ADDED 16 DEC, 1944 BY 48 SECTION  
DESIGN GROUP 104.

### NOTE--

STATUS OF EXISTING ENEMY AIRFIELDS GIVEN  
AS OF LAST PHOTO COVERAGE - 10 OCT, 1944

- INDICATES BEACHES
- PROPOSED NEW CONSTRUCTION

SCALE: 1 inch = 1000 feet  
0 1000 2000 3000 4000 5000  
SOUNDINGS IN FATHOMS  
HEIGHTS IN FEET

### FIELD READINESS DATES USING 3 AVN ENG BNS

| FIELD                      | 1      | 2      | 3     | 4      |
|----------------------------|--------|--------|-------|--------|
| OPERATIONAL FOR VP         | W + 15 | W + 0  | W + 0 | W + 30 |
| OPERATIONAL FOR VBH (Good) | W + 30 | W + 30 |       |        |

### CINCPOA - LOGISTICS - CONSTRUCTION SECTION

Forward by TELETYPE

Drawn by: 16 DEC, 1944

IE CHIMA

### PRELIMINARY STUDY OF AIRFIELD SITES

(SUPPLEMENT I  
TO ANNEX I  
OF APPENDIX G)

SCALE  
1" = 1000'

IN 1 SHEET

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ICEBERG  
ANNEX 2 TO APPENDIX G  
TROOP LIST - PHASE II

| UNIT  | T/O | <u>ASSAULT</u> |      |        | <u>GARRISON</u> |      |        | Mounting From | REMARKS  |
|---|-----|----------------|------|--------|-----------------|------|--------|---------------|--|
|   |     | Army           | Navy | Marine | Army            | Navy | Marine |               |  |
| Division (Reinforced)   | -   | 1 - 24500      | 500  |        | 1 - 5000        | 200  |        | Phase I       | One (1) RCT with appropriate medical units in Civil Affairs Team will remain in garrison phase. Additional Civil Affairs Team will arrive later. |
| Amphibious trained and equipped for independent operation including Garrison Beach Party. |     |                |      |        |                 |      |        |               |  |
| JASCO   |     |                |      |        |                 |      |        |               |  |
| Civil Affairs Team  |     | 24500          | 500  |        | 5000            | 200  |        |               |  |

Note: Unless otherwise indicated all units will mount from U.S.

AVIATION

|                     |         |  |  |  |          |  |  |           |
|---------------------|---------|--|--|--|----------|--|--|-----------|
| VBH Groups          | 1-117   |  |  |  | 2 - 3564 |  |  | Palau (1) |
| VF Groups           | (1-37)  |  |  |  | 2 - 2274 |  |  |           |
|                     | (1-12)  |  |  |  |          |  |  |           |
| Serv. Group Spec    | (1-452) |  |  |  | 4 - 2632 |  |  | Palau (1) |
|                     | (1-458) |  |  |  |          |  |  | U.S. (3)  |
|                     | (1-457) |  |  |  |          |  |  |           |
| Air Warning Sqdn    | E-691   |  |  |  |          |  |  | 1-230     |
| Base Hq & A.B. Sqdn | 1-422   |  |  |  | 2 - 202  |  |  |           |
| Weather Detachment  | -       |  |  |  | 1 - 15   |  |  |           |
| Aviation Sqdn       | 1-999   |  |  |  | 1 - 252  |  |  |           |
|                     |         |  |  |  | 8939     |  |  | 230       |

ANTI-AIRCRAFT

|                          |        |  |  |  |         |  |  |  |
|--------------------------|--------|--|--|--|---------|--|--|--|
| Hq & Hq Btry, Gp         | 44-12  |  |  |  | 1 - 73  |  |  |  |
| Gun Bn Sem (A), plus 2 - | 44-115 |  |  |  | 1 - 631 |  |  |  |
| Gun Btries Sem (A)       | 44-117 |  |  |  | 2 - 248 |  |  |  |
| AW Bn sem, plus          | 44-125 |  |  |  | 1 - 787 |  |  |  |
| 2 - AW Btries            | 44-127 |  |  |  | 2 - 328 |  |  |  |

UNIT

UNIT

T/O

ARMY

ASSAULT  
Navy

Marine

ARMY

GARRISON  
Navy

Marine

Mounting  
From

REMARKS

ANTI-AIRCRAFT (Cont'd)

S/L Btry (B) (less radar), plus  
1 - Plat (less radar)

44-138  
44-138

1-147  
1-52

FINANCE

Fin Disb Sec (AB-BG-Ca-DC types)

14-500

1-22

MEDICAL

Evacuation Hospital (SM) 400-bed

8-581

1-246

Depart with  
Assault Div.  
less nurses.  
Nurses

Station Hospital 500-bed  
Malaria Survey Unit (FB)  
Malaria Control Unit (FA)

8-560  
8-500  
8-500

1-337  
1-13  
1-12

ORDNANCE

Medium Maint Co

9-9

1-169

Only 3rd Ech.  
Maint.

Ord Dep Co  
Ord Med Auto Maint Co

9-57  
9-127

1-186  
1-120

Only 3rd Ech.  
Maint.

Bomb Disposal Sqd  
Ord Ammo Co Avn  
Ord Supply and Maint Co Avn

9-179  
9-17  
9-417

1-7  
1-179  
1-78

SIGNAL

Communication Unit

AACS Det

Sig Det Avn

Gp Hq (Augmented)

Sig Serv Co

Sig Cons Co Hv

11-217

11-500

11-500

11-67

1-30

1-100

1-48

1-250

1-204

1-100

739

246

362

2,265

22

632

## REFERENCES

1-134

P-1


•

## 55-116

This is considered adequate if the supplies to be handled do not exceed 40,000 M.T. per month above normal maintenance for garrison.



| UNIT                     | T/O | ASSAULT |      | GARRISON |       | Counting From | REMARKS |
|--------------------------|-----|---------|------|----------|-------|---------------|---------|
|                          |     | Army    | Navy | Marine   | Army  | Navy          | Marine  |
| <u>NAVAL UNITS</u>       |     |         |      |          |       |               |         |
| GROFAC                   | -   |         |      |          |       | 1 - 367       |         |
| Boat Pool                | -   |         |      |          |       | 1 - 350       |         |
|                          |     | 717     |      |          |       |               |         |
| TOTALS                   |     | 24746   | 500  |          | 23307 | 1575          | 230     |
| GRAND TOTAL ALL SERVICES |     | ASSAULT |      | GARRISON |       |               |         |
|                          |     | 25246   |      | 25112    |       |               |         |



ICEBERG

APPENDIX H

PHASE III

SEIZURE AND DEVELOPMENT OF ADDITIONAL POSITIONS

1. GENERAL

a. Objectives

Phase III will comprise the successive seizure of OKINO DAITO JIMA, KUME SHIMA, MIYAKO JIMA, and KIKAI JIMA, in the order listed. It is expected that lack of availability of service troops will preclude the seizure of any of these objectives except OKINO DAITO JIMA, until such time as the additional service units required become available in this theater.

Reconnaissance of the area is incomplete at the time of preparation of this study. More complete information may indicate that in some instances other objectives are more suitable than those selected and substitution of one objective for another is possible. It is not believed that changes will be made in objectives to a degree necessitating major modifications in the total and types of forces required.

Assuming that the necessary service troops are available, the operations comprising Phase III will conform to the following tentative time schedule, D being the day of initial landings on OKINAWA:

|       |                  |         |
|-------|------------------|---------|
| T Day | OKINO DAITO JIMA | D + 60  |
| K Day | KUME SHIMA       | D + 70  |
| A Day | MIYAKO JIMA      | D + 90  |
| F Day | KIKAI JIMA       | D + 120 |

Delays in the availability of service troops beyond the dates indicated above will impose corresponding delays in the seizure of the objectives.

b. Ground Forces

It is contemplated that assault forces for the execution of this phase, except those for OKINO DAITO JIMA, will if practicable be designated from the combat troops, including area reserves, allocated to ICEBERG. Mounting points will be OKINAWA JIMA for troops previously employed there, and the SOUTH PACIFIC for area reserves. Reduction of combat efficiency of divisions fighting in OKINAWA JIMA, together with lack of time for rehabilitation, may require the employment in this phase of combat units from HAWAII or the MARIANAS.

c. Air Forces

Preliminary bombardment of each objective and direct air support of successive assaults will be provided primarily by the Tactical Air Force based at OKINAWA, major components of which are four fighter groups and two medium bomber groups, a total of approximately 450 aircraft. Only in the case of MIYAKO JIMA is it necessary to augment shore based operations by employment of CVE aircraft, but they may be used if available.

Fast carrier task groups will cover the operations of Phase III by conducting continuing attacks against strategic and tactical targets in the Japanese mainland. These attacks will be coordinated with VLR operations of the 20th Air Force and will be intensified against KYUSHU and

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Western HONSHU during the movements of assault shipping in order to provide strategic support.

Escort carriers will provide air cover for movement of the assault shipping to MIYAKO JIMA and to a limited extent as required to OKINO DAITO JIMA, and provide direct air support as necessary for the landing operations at these objectives. Operations of the escort carriers are not considered necessary to support the capture of KUME SHIMA and KIKAI JIMA.

Transport carriers will transport aircraft, spares, pilots and air crews to the combat areas for the CVs, CVLs and CVEs. In addition they will be required to transport certain designated garrison aircraft units.

d. Naval Forces

In view of the reduced strength of the Japanese fleet, it is estimated that a covering force consisting of half of the fast carrier task groups will be sufficient in the OKINAWA area after about D / 20, for the purpose of protecting the area from sporadic surface raids and for covering the assaults on OKINO DAITO JIMA and on KUME SHIMA. The remaining half of the covering force will be available after that date for an operation in the NORTH PACIFIC area if necessary or for rehabilitation.

The fire support force, reduced approximately to half strength following Phase I will continue in the area throughout Phase II and Phase III except for full strength augmentation for the MIYAKO JIMA operation. It is expected

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that the two sections thus formed may be utilized in relays against the minor objectives in Phase III, or one of the sections may be allocated for operations in the NORTH PACIFIC if required.

2. OKINO DAITO JIMA - PHASE III a.

a. General Discussion

OKINO DAITO JIMA is selected primarily as the location for a Loran station. The early requirement for such an installation coupled with the fact that only small numbers of service troops will be required, dictate the high priority for seizure of this objective. An assault and occupation force will be mounted in the MARIANAS. This force will be additional to, and independent of, the forces then allocated to or engaged in the seizure or occupation of OKINAWA, except that certain fire support units and shore-based air units from the OKINAWA area will be required to assist in the assault. After the occupation of OKINO DAITO JIMA is completed, it is expected that the responsibility for administration, defense, and support of this island will pass to the Commanding General, Tenth Army.

b. Ground Forces

The estimated strength of the Japanese forces in the DAITO SHOTO is one RCT with supporting and service troops, totalling 4,100. Of this total, it is estimated that not over 1,000 are on OKINO DAITO JIMA, since the island is used primarily for commercial rather than military activities. The 1938 civil population was between 1500 and 2000. One RCT is considered sufficient for its capture and occupation, and

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one infantry battalion (reinforced) sufficient for its defense. Assault and garrison forces are listed in Annex 1 to this appendix.

The only suitable landing beach appears to be on the west coast; the scheme of maneuver will provide for landings in that area.

c. Air Forces

No air garrison is intended to be based on this island.

d. Naval Forces

The seizure of the weakly defended island of OKINO DAITO JIMA should not require more than about one-half the fire support force available in the OKINAWA area. At the time designated for this assault (about D / 60) it is expected that this force can be released from OKINAWA for a sufficient period to reduce the shore defenses and to support the assault at OKINO DAITO JIMA. Following the occupation, this force should proceed to LEYTE for rehabilitation preparatory to the assault on MIYAKO JIMA.

A covering force, estimated to be about one-half of the entire available covering force, should cover the operation from about T - 5 until about T / 10.

An air support force of CVEs with escorts is allocated for the purpose of providing close support for the approach and assault, and in order to neutralize any enemy air offensive from MINAMI DAITO JIMA.

One transport division will be assembled in the MARIANAS to lift the assault troops. Naval forces are listed in Annex 1 to this appendix.

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3. KUME SHIMA - PHASE III b.

a. General Discussion.

As soon as the necessary service units are available and assault forces can be released from preceding phases the capture, occupation, defense, and development of KUME SHIMA will be initiated. This objective is selected in order to acquire additional airfield sites for the following purposes:

(1) To intensify our air attacks on remaining enemy positions in the NANSEI SHOTO.

(2) To increase the strength of our air attacks on JAPAN.

(3) To assist in the air defense of our main position in OKINAWA.

(4) To disperse our greatly increased air strength and to broaden the base of our position for future operations.

KUME SHIMA occupies high priority in the order of objectives to be captured because of its relative proximity to OKINAWA, thus facilitating its capture and providing greater ease of mutual air support and logistic support.

The seizure of KUME SHIMA will be conducted as a shore-to-shore operation mounted in OKINAWA. Covering forces and fire support forces employed in Phase I and Phase II will be retained in or returned to the NANSEI SHOTO area in the strength required for the support of this operation.

b. Ground Forces

The estimated strength of the Japanese forces on KUME SHIMA is one RCT with auxiliary troops, totalling



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5,800. The 1940 civil population was 13,414. One division (reinforced) is considered a suitable assault force. One RCT will remain on the island for defense. Assault and garrison forces are listed in Annex 1 to this Appendix.

The most suitable landing beaches are in GIMA KO, on the west coast. Since the airfield sites desired are located in the northwest and north parts of the island, an assault force which lands in GIMA KO will be in position to strike quickly at these objectives. Consequently the scheme of maneuver will provide for landings in that area in order to capture the north and northwest parts of the island. This will be followed by the capture of the remainder of the island.

c. Air Forces

Prior to the landing, beach defenses will be attacked by shore based air forces from OKINAWA to destroy defensive installations and to provide cover for minesweeping and clearance of underwater defenses.

Direct air support will be provided by the Tactical Air Force beginning on K Day.

Two airfields will be developed, one as a base for two heavy bomber groups, the other to accommodate one night fighter squadron and two fighter groups. Garrison air units are listed in Annex 1 to this appendix.

d. Naval Forces

The fire support units engaged in the assault on OKINO DAITO SHIMA will not be available for the assault on KUME SHIMA; the remaining units in the OKINAWA area therefore will be utilized to support the assault on this

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objective. Following the occupation of KUME SHIMA, this force should return to NAKAGUSUKU WAN for resupply and again become available for the assault on MIYAKO JIMA.

The capture of this objective will be supported by the reduced covering force which is expected to remain in the OKINAWA area.

No escort carriers are provided for supporting the assault on KUME SHIMA as this position is only 50 miles from OKINAWA and can therefore be supported by shore based aircraft from the newly acquired airfields at this place.

Landing craft retained from previous phases will be utilized to lift the assault force.

Naval forces are listed in Annex 1 to this appendix.

#### 4. MIYAKO JIMA - Phase III c.

##### a. General Discussion

MIYAKO JIMA has been selected as the next assault objective following KUME SHIMA. This objective is selected in order to acquire additional airfield sites for the following purposes:

- (1) To provide a base relatively close to JAPAN for VLR aircraft.
- (2) To provide an offensive air base to complete the neutralization of enemy positions in FORMOSA.
- (3) As a defensive southern outpost to provide greater security for our position in OKINAWA.

The capture, occupation, defense, and development of MIYAKO will be initiated as soon as the necessary service troops become available and the necessary assault shipping and combat units can be released from operations

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in the OKINAWA area. Maximum naval covering and fire support forces available will be employed.

The Commanding General, Tenth Army will be responsible for designating the ground forces for this operation and for the shore defenses, administration, and logistic support of the island.

b. Ground Forces

The estimated strength of the Japanese forces on MIYAKO JIMA is one infantry division (less one RCT) with supporting and service troops, totalling 16,000. The 1940 civil population was 60,786. A corps of three reinforced divisions is considered a suitable assault force. One of these divisions will remain on the island for defense. Assault and garrison forces are listed in Annex 1 to this Appendix.

The coast of MIYAKO is nearly everywhere precipitous. The most extensive beaches border the peninsulas forming JUNK BAY. Though these beaches are backed by relatively low, rough, wooded escarpments, access inland is probably less obstructed than from any other beaches. The small islands of YERABO, SHIMOJI, and KURUMA which lie from 1-1/2 to 4-1/2 miles off JUNK BAY afford possible positions for emplacement of artillery to support the landing forces. The three existing enemy airfields are grouped on an arc about JUNK BAY, at a distance of from 1 to 2 miles therefrom. The scheme of maneuver will provide for the seizure of the three small off-lying islands on A-1 day, and the emplacement of artillery to support the main landings on A Day. Two divisions in the assault will land in JUNK BAY

area in order to seize the three existing airfields. The attack will then be continued to capture the remainder of the island. A third division will be held initially in floating reserve.

c.    Air Forces

Prior to our attack the defenses of MIYAKO will have been subjected to damage as a result of repeated air attacks designed to neutralize its air bases as a safeguard for our position in OKINAWA. About A - 10 an intensive air attack will be initiated to destroy defensive installations. Direct air support will be provided by CVEs. During the assault phase, shore based aircraft from OKINAWA will provide support by neutralizing other enemy air bases in the SAKASHIMA GUNTO.

Five airfields will be constructed to accommodate one wing (four groups) of very long range bombers, two fighter groups, one night fighter squadron, and one Marine torpedo bomber squadron for anti-submarine patrol.

Air forces are listed in Annex 1 to this appendix.

d.    Naval Forces

All available fire support units will be required in order to effect maximum destruction of enemy defenses prior to the assault. The fire support units will be assembled in OKINAWA and will precede the assault force to the objective by at least five days.

The covering force is also augmented for this assault because of the proximity to FORMOSA and the necessity

of neutralizing the numerous enemy airfields there and in the remaining islands of the SAKASHIMA GUNTO.

An augmented air support force of CVEs is provided to furnish direct support of the landings.

The assault shipping for this operation comprises three transport squadrons. The mounting points selected for assembling these squadrons will depend upon the choice of troop divisions to be employed. The transport squadrons will be selected from those previously utilized in the OKINAWA assault; the estimated target date of D / 90 will permit their redeployment for the MIYAKO JIMA assault, regardless of the location of mounting points.

Naval forces are listed in Annex 1 to this appendix.

5. KIKAI JIMA - PHASE III d.

a. General Discussion

The final objective for Phase III is KIKAI JIMA. This objective is selected in order to acquire additional airfield sites for the following purposes:

To provide forward bases for operation of escort fighters and as a defensive outpost to the north of OKINAWA.

The seizure of this objective will be conducted as a shore-to-shore movement using amphibious craft and employing assault forces released from active operations in the OKINAWA area. Naval covering and fire support forces will be retained as required from the MIYAKO JIMA operation to support the assault on KIKAI.

b. Ground Forces

The estimated strength of the Japanese forces in the AMAMI Group is one division with supporting and service troops, totalling 17,460. Of this total it is estimated that 2,250 are on KIKAI JIMA. The 1940 civil population was 18,184. In view of the enemy combat strength in the AMAMI GUNTO, and his capability of quickly reinforcing KIKAI JIMA, it is estimated that one reinforced division and one infantry parachute regiment should constitute the assault force. Owing to the limited beaches and the difficult hinterland, the infantry parachute regiment is employed concurrently with the amphibious landing in order to facilitate the landing and advance inland. The assault division should remain as a garrison force until all airfields have been activated. Thereafter, one RCT will constitute the garrison force. Assault and garrison forces are listed in Annex 1 to this appendix.

The only potential landing beaches are at SOMACHI HAKUCHI on the northeast coast, and at ONOTSU on the northwest coast. Weather permitting, the former is considered the better landing area. The scheme of maneuver will provide for the seizure by an infantry parachute regiment of the high ground controlling the landing beaches and the simultaneous landing of the assault force at SOMACHI HAKUCHI; or alternatively, at ONOTSU in the event of unfavorable weather conditions on the northeast coast. The landing force will establish contact with the parachute regiment, secure a beach-head, and then complete capture of the remainder of the island.

c. Air Forces

Air operations against KIKAI will be continuous after our establishment in OKINAWA in order to establish and maintain its neutralization. Following our capture of KUME and MIYAKO the entire offensive effort of the Tactical Air Force will be available for employment against KIKAI. The proximity of KIKAI to KYUSHU renders it inadvisable to expose CVEs to attack from that major air center. The short distance, 155 miles, from OKINAWA to KIKAI will enable shore-based air forces to provide convoy cover, direct air support and CAP over our forces at the objective. To augment the strength available, units of the Strategical Air Force will be attached to the Tactical Air Force as required.

KIKAI will be developed to provide a base for four fighter groups, two night fighter squadrons and one Marine torpedo bomber squadron.

Air forces are listed in Annex 1 to this appendix.

d. Naval Forces

The fire support force designated for the assault on KIKAI JIMA is the same as that employed against KUME SHIMA.

The same covering force employed in the assault on MIYAKO JIMA is again employed to cover the assault on KIKAI JIMA; this augmented force is considered necessary because of the proximity of the objective to KYUSHU and the necessity of neutralizing enemy air attacks from JAPAN. Close air support will be provided by shore based aircraft from OKINAWA;

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therefore, no close naval air support force is included.

The assault shipping will consist exclusively of landing craft which will have been retained from the KUME SHIMA assault. It is expected that these will be assembled in OKINAWA where the assault force will be mounted.

Naval forces are listed in Annex 1 to this appendix.



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Annex 1 to Appendix H

MAJOR FORCES REQUIRED - PHASE III

1. GROUND FORCES.

| <u>Assault Forces</u>  | <u>OKINO<br/>DAITO<br/>JIMA</u> | <u>KUME<br/>SHIMA</u> | <u>MIYAKO<br/>JIMA</u> | <u>KIKAI<br/>JIMA</u> |
|--|---------------------------------|-----------------------|------------------------|-----------------------|
| Corps Headquarters <del>and</del><br><del>Chrys Troops</del> |                                 |                       | 1                      |                       |
| Amphibious Divisions   |                                 | 1                     | 3                      | 1                     |
| Infantry Regiment  | 1                               |                       |                        |                       |
| Parachute Regiment, Inf.                                     |                                 |                       |                        | 1                     |
| Tank Battalions (Medium)                                     |                                 | 1                     | 3                      | 1                     |
| Hq and Hq Co. Tank Gp  |                                 |                       | 1                      |                       |
| Tank Company (Medium)  | 1                               |                       |                        |                       |
| Engineer Combat Bn   | 1                               | 3                     | 9                      | 3                     |
| Hq & Hq Co. Engr Combat Gp                                   |                                 | 1                     | 3                      | 1                     |
| Engr Topo Bn   |                                 |                       | 1                      |                       |
| Amphibious Tractor Bn  |                                 | 3                     | 9                      | 3                     |
| Amphibious Tractor Co  | 2                               |                       |                        | 2                     |
| Amphibious Truck Bn  |                                 | 1                     | 3                      | 1                     |
| Amphibious Tank Co   | 1                               |                       |                        |                       |
| Amphibious Truck Co  | 1                               | 2                     | 6                      | 2                     |
| JASCOS   |                                 | 1                     | 3                      | 1                     |
| JASCO Det  | 1                               |                       |                        |                       |
| Chemical Bn (Motorized)                                      |                                 | 1                     | 1                      | 1                     |
| Chemical Co (Motorized)                                      | 1                               |                       |                        |                       |
| AAA A/W Bn   |                                 | 1                     | 3                      | 1                     |
| AAA A/W Btry   | 1                               |                       |                        |                       |
| MP Battalion   |                                 |                       | 1                      |                       |
| Hq & Hq Btry, Corps Arty                                     |                                 |                       | 1                      |                       |

Assault Forces (Cont'd)

|                       | OKINO<br>DAITO<br>JIMA | KUME<br>SHIMA | MIYAKO<br>JIMA | KIKAI<br>JIMA |
|-----------------------|------------------------|---------------|----------------|---------------|
| 155mm Gun Bn          |                        |               | 3              |               |
| 155mm How Bn          |                        |               | 3              |               |
| 8" or 240mm How Bn    |                        |               | 2              |               |
| Observation Bn (FA)   |                        |               | 1              |               |
| Hq & Hq Battery FA Gp |                        |               | 2              |               |
| FA Bn (105mm How)     | 1                      |               |                |               |
| Tank Destroyer Bn     |                        |               | 1              |               |

Garrison Forces

|                         |   |   |   |   | Total |
|-------------------------|---|---|---|---|-------|
| Amphibious Division     |   |   | 1 |   | 1*    |
| Infantry Regiment       |   | 1 |   | 1 | 2*    |
| Infantry Battalion      | 1 |   |   |   | 1*    |
| Tank Battalion (Medium) |   |   | 1 |   | 1*    |
| Tank Company (Medium)   |   | 1 |   | 1 | 2*    |
| Tank Platoon (Medium)   | 1 |   |   |   | 1*    |
| AAA Gun Bn              |   | 2 | 3 | 2 | 7     |
| AAA Gun Btry            | 1 |   |   |   | 1     |
| AAA A/W Bn              |   | 2 | 2 | 2 | 6*    |
| AAA A/W Btry            | 1 |   |   |   | 1*    |
| AAA S/L Bn              |   | 1 | 1 | 1 | 3     |
| AAA S/L Platoon         | 1 |   |   |   | 1     |
| Hq & Hq Btry AAA Gp     |   | 1 | 2 | 1 | 4     |
| 155mm Gun (CA) Bn       | 1 | 1 | 3 | 2 | 7     |
| Hq & Hq Btry CA Gp      |   |   | 1 |   | 1     |
| FA Bn (105mm)           |   | 1 |   | 1 | 2*    |
| FA Btry (105mm)         | 1 |   |   |   | 1*    |
| MP Battalion            |   |   | 1 |   | 1*    |

\* From assault force.

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## 2. AIR FORCES

| <u>Garrison</u>                     | <u>KUME<br/>SHIMA</u> | <u>MIYAKO<br/>JIMA</u> | <u>KIKAI<br/>JIMA</u> | <u>Total</u> |
|-------------------------------------|-----------------------|------------------------|-----------------------|--------------|
| VF Groups (Army)                    | 2                     | 2                      | 4                     | 8            |
| VF (N) Sqdns (Army)                 | 1                     | 1                      | 2                     | 4            |
| VMTB Sqdns (Mar)                    |                       | 1                      | 1                     | 2            |
| VBH Groups (Army)                   | 2                     |                        |                       | 2            |
| VBVH Groups (Army)                  |                       | 4                      |                       | 4            |
| Sig AW Co (Army)                    | 1                     | 2                      | 2                     | 5            |
| AV Engr Bn (Army)                   | 3                     | 8                      | 4                     | 15           |
| Air Service Groups<br>(Spec) (Army) | 4                     | 2                      | 4                     | 10           |

## 3. NAVAL FORCES

| <u>Covering Force</u>     | <u>OKINO<br/>DAITO<br/>JIMA</u> | <u>KUME<br/>SHIMA</u> | <u>MIYAKO<br/>JIMA</u> | <u>KIKAI<br/>JIMA</u> |
|---------------------------|---------------------------------|-----------------------|------------------------|-----------------------|
| CV                        | 6                               | 6                     | 8                      | 8                     |
| CVL                       | 3                               | 3                     | 4                      | 4                     |
| BB                        | 4                               | 4                     | 6                      | 6                     |
| CA                        | 4                               | 4                     | 6                      | 6                     |
| CL                        | 4                               | 4                     | 4                      | 4                     |
| CL(AA)                    | 3                               | 3                     | 4                      | 4                     |
| DD                        | 44                              | 44                    | 62                     | 62                    |
| <u>Fire Support Force</u> |                                 |                       |                        |                       |
| OBB                       | 4                               | 6                     | 10                     | 6                     |
| CB                        | 0                               | 0                     | 2                      | 0                     |
| CA                        | 2                               | 3                     | 4                      | 3                     |
| CL                        | 2                               | 3                     | 4                      | 3                     |
| DD                        | 18                              | 18                    | 27                     | 18                    |
| LCI(G)                    | 9                               | 9                     | 18                     | 9                     |
| LCI(M)                    | 0                               | 9                     | 18                     | 9                     |

Air Support Force

CVE

OKINO  
DAITO  
JIMA

6

KUME  
SHIMA

0

MIYAKO  
JIMA

12

KIKAI  
JIMA

0

DD

12

0

18

0

Assault Shipping

AGC

1

1

3

1

APA

5

0

45

0

AKA

2

0

18

0

LSV

0

0

3

0

LSD

1

2

3

2

LST

10

30

100

30

LCT

0

10

20

10

LCI(L)

0

36

0

36

LSM

0

20

30

20

DD

9

9

27

9

DE

6

6

12

6

DMS

4

4

6

4

APD

0

12

6

12

AM

4

4

6

4

YMS

0

12

12

12

PC

4

6

12

6

Base Defense and  
Support Force

DD

0

0

9

9

DE

0

0

0

6

PC

4

6

6

6

SC

0

6

6

6

Base Defense and  
Support Force (Cont'd)

|        | <u>OKINO<br/>DAITO<br/>JIMA</u> | <u>KUME<br/>SHIMA</u> | <u>MIYAKO<br/>JIMA</u> | <u>KIKAI<br/>JIMA</u> |
|--------|---------------------------------|-----------------------|------------------------|-----------------------|
| YMS    | 0                               | 6                     | 6                      | 6                     |
| LST    | 2                               | 4                     | 10                     | 4                     |
| LCT    | 0                               | 10                    | 10                     | 10                    |
| LCI(L) | 0                               | 18                    | 18                     | 18                    |
| PT     | 0                               | 0                     | 0                      | 24                    |
| AGP    | 0                               | 0                     | 0                      | 2                     |
| ARL    | 0                               | 1                     | 1                      | 1                     |
| AD     | 0                               | 0                     | 1                      | 0                     |
| AN     | 0                               | 0                     | 4                      | 4                     |
| YMT    | 0                               | 0                     | 4                      | 4                     |
| YTB    | 0                               | 0                     | 4                      | 0                     |
| YNg    | 0                               | 0                     | 2                      | 2                     |
| LCM    | 6                               | 20                    | 60                     | 20                    |
| LCVP   | 6                               | 10                    | 20                     | 10                    |